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SHARING STORIES: NARRATIVE
LAWYERING IN BENCH TRIALS
PAUL HOLLAND*
This article extends narrative lawyering theory to the generally
neglected subject of bench trial litigation. Closely examining three
trials-one contract dispute and two criminal cases-and drawing on
recent research into judges' cognitive habits, the Article explores the
special challenges lawyers face when trying a case to a judge. The
feedback that judges give during bench trials-often intended, some-
times unconscious-requires lawyers to be as deft in processing infor-
mation as they are thoughtful and effective in presenting it. Judges'
familiarity with the substance of the law and the rituals and customs
of trials require lawyers to be especially creative if they are to avoid
having their story stamped as just another version of a routine the
judge has been through before. The three profiled trials provide a
wealth of examples of the peculiar difficulties lawyers face in bench
trials, the perils of failing to appreciate them, and the narrative pos-
sibilities most likely to be effective in this distinctive setting.
INTRODUCTION
I once watched a talented defense attorney attempt to convince a
juvenile court judge that his client had nothing to do with the drugs
the police had allegedly found in the back seat of their squad car after
transporting the client to the station. Arguing a point of law mid-trial,
the defender slipped, asserting that the court would have to rule in his
favor "if this was a real trial." Of course, this lawyer meant to say
"jury trial," and did not intend to so baldly question the legitimacy of
the proceedings. This gaffe' exemplifies a widely-shared view that
bench trials are inferior, even insubstantial, when compared to jury
trials. The common practice of referring to bench trials as "nonjury
trials" reflects this cultural ordering. This mindset has real conse-
quences: recent research has shown that lawyers are generally una-
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Seattle University
School of Law. I wish to thank Professors Randy Hertz, John Mitchell, and Robert Chang
and Judge (retired) Robert Alsdorf for their thoughtful comments upon drafts of this Arti-
cle. I received invaluable research assistance from Associate Librarian Kerry Fitz-Gerald
and law student Stephanie Gilfeather. Finally, thanks to Deans Kellye Testy and Annette
Clark for the support that made the production of this article possible.
1 See Michael Kinsley, Gaffes to the Rescue, TIME, Feb. 19, 2007, at 80 ("Meanwhile, a
gaffe, it has been said, is when a politician tells the truth-or more precisely, when he or
she accidentally reveals something truthful about what is going on in his or her head.").
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ware of and, when made aware, largely indifferent to data showing
that for more than a decade federal judges acquitted defendants at
higher rates than juries did.2 It was as if these bench trials were some-
how not real, not meaningful. Because so many cases-a majority of
all criminal trials and a third of all felony trials in one recent study3-
are resolved by bench trial, it is insufficient to view bench trials prima-
rily in terms of what they lack (i.e., jurors) and necessary to focus on
what they present: a set of distinctive interactions between lawyers
and judges that demands a distinctive lawyeririg approach.
Narrative lawyering theory provides a framework for evaluating
these interactions and constructing such an approach. "A particularly
useful way of understanding much of what lawyers do in litigation, ' '4
narrative lawyering theory is founded upon an appreciation of the role
that stories play in the cognitive processes by which humans make
sense of experience. 5 Research has shown that jurors organize their
thoughts about a case and arrive at their judgment through stories.
They do not merely choose between the stories offered by the lawyers;
they construct a story that fully captures their experience of the trial. 6
Lawyers seeking maximum influence over this process must consider
the narrative implications of all the decisions they make or actions
they take throughout the trial. 7
Bench trials have not received sustained attention from narrative
lawyering theorists, 8 but recent research demonstrating that judges
2 Andrew Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
151, 219 (2005) ("[E]ven among lawyers who have learned of the rate gap, several ex-
pressed doubts that they would dramatically alter their practices. When asked why, some
lawyers still insisted that juries were better for the defense ... ").
3 Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Examining
Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 755, 767-68
(2004) (analyzing data from 23 states from 1976 to 2002).
4 Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First
Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
5 See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN
THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); JEROME
BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 86 (1990); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive
Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
6 Pennington, supra note 5, at 523 ("When we hypothesize that jurors impose a narra-
tive organization on evidence, we mean that jurors engage in an active, constructive com-
prehension process in which evidence is organized, elaborated, and interpreted by them in
the course of the trial.").
7 See Alper, supra note 4, at 119 ("Recent legal scholarship on story-telling in litiga-
tion thus suggests the extent to which an advocate's decisions about most basic aspects of
trial conduct-pretrial maneuvers, opening and closing statements, presentation of evi-
dence, and even behavior in the courtroom-implement strategic judgments about the na-
ture of the story slhe will communicate to the fact-finder.").
8 See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice:
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 587-88
(1998) ("[T]here is no empirical (or even anecdotal) basis for assessing the kinds of narra-
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employ similar cognitive processes (and are prone to the same falla-
cies) as the general population 9 suggests that judges are likely to be
equally, if peculiarly, dependent upon story structures for making
sense of the information presented at trial. Examining three recent
bench trials, this Article illuminates how the narrative processes of
advocate and audience are both enmeshed and intensified in bench
trials. The enmeshed, or intertwined, nature of bench trial narratives
is most apparent in the moments when judges explicitly respond to,
interfere in, or even supplant lawyers' efforts to tell their stories.
Bench trials present a stark contrast to jury trials, in which "there is
no verbal or non-verbal feedback between the speaker(s) and the au-
dience."10 The bilateral nature of bench trial communication means
that lawyers must be both performer and audience,11 alternating roles
frequently, sometimes within the span of a breath or a gesture. The
heightened intensity of bench trial narratives is fueled by judges' abil-
ity, due to their experience and training, to seize on the gaps or weak-
nesses in lawyers' trial storytelling. 12 Familiarity with the trial process
also equips judges to interpret lawyers' decisions in light of patterns of
which jurors would be unaware. In sum, bench trial narratives emerge
from a process of joint creative control' 3 that requires lawyers to
make adjustments at every stage of the trial.
Part I of this Article introduces some of the fundamental ele-
ments of narrative lawyering theory and then sketches the bench trials
tive approaches that are likely to prevail in a bench trial."); cf. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THE-
ORY OF THE TRIAL 8 (1999) (asserting that the theory of lawyer performance "applies with
equal force to bench and jury trials.").
9 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie,
Blinking]; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1251 (2005) [hereinafter Guthrie, Judges Ignore]; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) [hereinafter
Guthrie, Inside].
10 Albert Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 273, 278 (1989).
11 Mark Aronson has identified a similar dual perspective in the context of counseling
clients. Mark Aronson, We Ask You To Consider: Learning About Practical Judgment in
Lawyering, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 247, 284 (1998) ("[T]o be effective lawyers often have to be
actors and spectators at the same time.").
12 See Sean Doran, John D. Jackson & Michael Seigel, Rethinking Adversariness in
Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 40 (1995) ("[A]s counsel you feel that aca-
demically you are pinned more to the tip of your collar than in a jury case. There's just you
and him and you've got to be on your toes, as it were, academically and intellectually
because there's no waffle.").
13 Herbert A. Eastman captures this sense of joint yet dual attachments when he de-
scribed how a close reading of civil rights pleadings showed that "[t]he lawyer's meaning
and the judge's meaning are not coterminous, but shared." Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking
Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 765, 799 (1995).
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to which the theory will be applied. This Part also identifies the indi-
vidual and collective characteristics that make the selected cases ap-
propriate subjects for drawing general conclusions. Parts II-IV
analyze the profiled cases, building a comprehensive framework of
narrative dynamics across the stages of a bench trial. Part II focuses
on opening statements, where the lawyers begin their storytelling.
Bench trial openings bear substantial formal similarity to their jury
trial analogs. However, narrative analysis of the openings in the cases
under review demonstrates that the greater intensity of bench trials is
detectable, if not always obvious, from the outset. In all three cases, 14
the lines drawn at the time of opening establish patterns that mark the
interactions between lawyers and judges throughout the entire trial.
Part III explores how judges often reveal their developing conception
of the trial's story through their involvement in witness examinations
and evidentiary arguments. The judges in the three cases demon-
strated sharply different degrees of involvement, but each communi-
cated strongly. Part IV examines the moment when the narratives of
lawyer and judge can most directly be joined: closing argument. For-
mally, closing presents the clearest distinction between bench and jury
trials. Jurors must, of course, remain silent during closing and are ad-
monished to withhold judgment until they begin deliberating as a
group. Judges, who, of course, deliberate alone and often decide cases
immediately, may jump in during closing with questions and com-
ments. Bench trial closing thus becomes a dialogue, simultaneously a
microcosm and a culmination of the joint process of the entire trial.
The closings in the trials under review offer powerful lessons about
narrative at this critical stage and at every moment leading up to it.
Part V offers (1) suggestions for procedural reform to improve the
quality and uniformity of bench trial communication and (2) ideas for
lawyer training and practice that meet the specific demands bench tri-
als impose.
I. NARRATIVE THEORY AND BENCH TRIALS: BRIEF SKETCHES
A. An Introduction to Narrative Theory
The claim that narrative "means constructing and telling stories
and includes the rhetorical creation of an imaginative world in which
the story can happen"'15 might well scare off a lawyer preparing for a
bench trial. "Surely," this lawyer might say, "the judge will not be
interested in or even tolerant of my 'stories,' let alone my 'creation of
14 The lawyers in one trial waived opening, but this was as meaningful in constituting
the trial's narrative dynamics as the openings delivered in the other two cases were.
15 Alper, supra note 4, at 4.
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an imaginative world.' I can hear the judge now, 'Save it for your jury
trials, counsel."' However understandable, this temptation must be
resisted. Firmly rooted in the science of perception, 16 narrative theory
offers lawyers useful tools for approaching any case and persuading
any audience. Psychological research has demonstrated that jurors
process and interpret trial information through the unconscious use of
constructs such as schemas 17 and "stock scripts." '18 As people do in
everyday activities, jurors use schemas-i.e., standard mental catego-
ries-as filters, directing their attention to specific items within the
potentially overwhelming flow of trial data. Having organized the in-
formation by use of a familiar pattern, jurors can then make sense of
it.19 A script is a dynamic schema, one in which individuals play cus-
tomary roles in a conventional setting.20
Narrative lawyering theorists have advanced our understanding
of how lawyers' trial performances engage these cognitive processes.
In their frequently-cited analysis of closing arguments in a homicide
jury trial, Professors Anthony Amsterdam and Randy Hertz explain
the mechanics of the arguments in terms of their macrostructure and
microstructure. 21 "Macrostructure" refers to the way in which a law-
yer's argument (1) constructs a relationship between the lawyer and
the jury and (2) defines, albeit often implicitly, the jurors' task.22 In
the closings that Amsterdam and Hertz examine, defense counsel
sought a dialogue between lawyer and jury, while the prosecutor's ar-
gument cabined the jurors into a more passive role, receiving the evi-
dence and the argument.23 These constructs aligned with the lawyers'
objectives. The prosecutor wanted the jurors to move quickly from
the undisputed (and largely unexplained) fact that the defendant shot
the victim to a finding of intent and, thus, of guilt. Defense counsel
hoped to encourage the jurors to explore and consider a wider range
16 Id. at 5 ("[N]arrative is 'a primary and irreducible form of human comprehension."')
(quoting Louis 0. Mink, Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument, in THE WRITING OF
HISTORY: LITERARY FORM HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 129, 132 (Robert H. Canary &
Henry Kozicki eds., 1978)).
17 Moore, supra note 10, at 279 ("[A] schema is a category in the mind which contains
information about a particular subject.").
18 Alper, supra note 4, at 7 (asserting that such scripts "provide all of us with walk-
through models of how life is lived, how crimes are committed, how reality unfolds").
19 Moore, supra note 10, at 279-81.
20 See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING
SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS
132 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the varying and somewhat overlapping ways in which the
terms "script" and "dynamic schema" are used).
21 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a
Jury, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 55 (1992).
22 Id. at 78.
23 Id. at 78, 80-82.
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of possibilities, even in the absence of a single compelling exculpatory
explanation.
In a series of articles devoted to the macrostructure of a single
closing argument in a racketeering trial, 24 Philip Meyer has employed
narrative analysis to show the freedom trial lawyers have to occupy
the vast space between the two approaches Amsterdam and Hertz de-
scribed. Drawing on modern screenwriting precepts, Meyer shows
how the lawyer he profiles led the jury through "sequences of
scenes" 25 chosen for thematic purposes, establishing character, moti-
vation, and perspective, rather than merely driving plot.26 Meyer's ex-
ample demonstrates how a narrative sensibility can elevate lawyering
above mere storytelling. In the face of hours of incriminating audio
recordings, defense counsel created "an imaginative world" 27 in which
acquittal was at least plausible, a feat that Meyer describes as surpris-
ing,28 notwithstanding the ultimate verdict of guilt.
As Amsterdam and Hertz apply the term, "microstructure" refers
to aspects of lawyer performance that work at a level often too fine to
be detected while they are happening. For example, they chart "the
frequency with which the lawyers use the various parts of speech" and
how it "reveals-and at the same time shapes-the stories they
choose to tell." 29 They connect these matters of grammar to the high-
est-level aspects of jurors' thinking: "The prosecutor's verbs to de-
scribe the jury's function stress judgment, defense counsel's stress
action and the Heroic Quest. '30 Writing with Amsterdam, Hertz, and
others about the trial of the officers who injured and arrested Rodney
King, Todd Edelman focuses on microstructural elements to demon-
24 Philip Meyer, "Desperate for Love" III: Rethinking Closing Arguments as Stories, 50
S.C. L. REV. 715 (1999) [hereinafter Meyer, Desperate III]; Philip Meyer, "Desperate for
Love H": Further Reflections on the Interpenetration of Legal and Popular Storytelling in
Closing Arguments to a Jury in a Complex Criminal Case, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 931 (1996)
[hereinafter Meyer, Desperate II]; Philip Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influ-
ences upon a Defendant's Closing Argument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REV. 721 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Meyer, Desperate I].
25 Meyer, Desperate 1, supra note 24, at 734; see also id. at 722 ("[T]he argument
presented a three-part narrative structure akin to the three act classical drama structure as
reconfigured in commercial film.").
26 Id. at 728 ("He established a sympathetic character and point of view-[the defen-
dant's]-and implicated the dramatic situation: the bumbling everyman, a low-level Mafi-
oso struggling to make a living, trapped by the orders and commands coming down from
the Connecticut capo.").
27 Meyer, Desperate II, supra note 24, at 959.
28 Meyer, Desperate I, supra note 24, at 725 ("Before the closing argument, I did not
know how [defense counsel Jeremiah Donovan] could respond to the evidence against [his
client].").
29 Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 74.
30 Id. at 97 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 95 ("Defense counsel tends to use
metaphors that depict the jury's thinking processes as physical and active.").
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strate the effectiveness of a particularly powerful cross-examination.
Defense counsel had the witness, another officer present at the inci-
dent, guide the jury through a viewing of the well-known video re-
cording of the event. "Prefacing any questioning . . . about a
particular segment of the tape not only with an announcement of the
counter number on each frame ... but with a description of the posi-
tion of all of the figures on the screen, ' 31 the lawyer implicitly chal-
lenged the prosecution's central argument that the tape could speak
for itself (and that all of America knew what the tape said). Con-
ducted "from a multitude of angles, physical and interpretive, ' 32 the
cross-examination enacted the defense theme that there was more
than one way to look at the tape and that the jurors were bound by
their oath to consider them all.33
This admittedly compressed framework of the narrative law-
yering literature has been drawn from cases involving some central
undisputed fact or seemingly dispositive body of evidence. In the
homicide trial, defense counsel did not deny that his client had fired
the weapon that killed the victim. In the other two cases, the prosecu-
tion presented recordings of the defendants' allegedly criminal acts.
This aspect of the trials might be assumed to narrow the field in which
the lawyers can operate, much as the presence of a judge in the fact-
finding role is commonly thought to constrain lawyers' advocacy in
bench trials. The literature shows how narrative, when thoughtfully
and robustly employed, expands possibilities while remaining
anchored in the reality of the evidence. The later Parts of this Article
will likewise demonstrate how the core principles of narrative theory,
when adapted to the distinctive features of bench trials, uncover deep
veins of creative advocacy for lawyers capable of tapping them.
Before those possibilities are described, this Part will continue with
capsule sketches of the cases from which they will be constructed.
B. An Introduction to the Cases
This Sub-Part summarizes the three trials under examination in
this Article, setting the stage for the focused discussion of narrative
bench trial lawyering to follow. All three trials took place in Seattle in
the summer of 2008. In the most prominent, the city of Seattle sued
31 Alper, supra note 4, at 135. Edelman also points out that defense counsel high-
lighted the logistical challenges of operating the video equipment, perhaps to further estab-
lish the idea in the jury's mind that nothing was easy about the videotape. Id. at 134
("Stone emphasized the complexities involved in viewing this evidence by repeatedly de-
claring himself incompetent to work the equipment properly.").
32 Id. at 135.
33 See discussion of how defense counsel used voir dire to prepare the jury for this
approach infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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the new, Oklahoma-based owners of the local NBA team, the Super-
sonics, to enforce a lease provision requiring the team to play all its
home games in Key Arena and thus prevent the team from moving to
Oklahoma City. The trial took place in United States District Court
and pitted one of the largest and most prominent national law firms
against a highly-regarded, though much smaller, local litigation firm.
The trial lasted six days (stretched over three weeks), drew overflow
crowds, and was the subject of extensive local and some national me-
dia attention before ending in a settlement late on the day the judge
was to rule. The other two cases took place in nearby King County
Juvenile Court. One involved a teenager who allegedly tore down her
bedroom closet door in the midst of an emotional outburst, the other
a thwarted attempt to steal a bottle of wine from a supermarket. The
slammed-door trial took but a few hours; the trial in the supermarket
case stretched over parts of three days. All of the lawyers in both of
these cases were fairly inexperienced. As is common in juvenile court
criminal litigation, the judge in each case ruled instantly upon the
completion of closing arguments. 34 Unsurprisingly, there was no me-
dia coverage of either case. As will be described within, the differ-
ences among these cases, although significant for some of the
foregoing analysis, often recede to reveal deep structural similarities
that generate a broadly applicable understanding of bench trial
lawyering.
1. Not Whodunit, but "What Did He Do?"
The respondent in the bungled theft case was charged in juvenile
court with Assault in the Second Degree.35 The state alleged that he
had gone to a Safeway supermarket with another youth and waited in
the parking lot while the other youth entered the store and walked out
with a bottle of wine for which he had not paid. When a security
guard attempted to apprehend the thief, the respondent allegedly
struck the security guard in the back of the head, enabling the other
youth to escape and causing injuries that required examination at a
hospital later that evening. The prosecutor had been admitted to the
bar approximately three months before this trial, and defense counsel,
a solo practitioner with an emphasis on criminal practice, had been
practicing for slightly more than two years. The judge had been on
the bench for fifteen years.
The proceedings began with a pretrial hearing at which the judge
34 For a discussion of the problematic nature of this feature of bench trials, see Guggen-
heim, supra note 8, at 581. See also Guthrie, Blinking, supra note 9, at 43 ("Like cogent
medical judgments, cogent legal judgments call for deliberation. Justice depends on it.").
35 WASH. REV. CODE. § 9A.36.021 (2008).
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ruled that a written statement the respondent made to the police was
admissible. 36 Immediately after reading the statement, the judge re-
cessed the trial and called counsel into chambers. The in-chambers
discussion was not on the record, but from remarks audible in the
courtroom and comments made later in the trial, it was apparent that
the judge had: (1) directed counsel to read a case that he believed
established at least a minimal level of criminal liability for the respon-
dent; and (2) encouraged counsel to pursue a settlement in light of
that precedent. The parties did not reach any agreement, and the trial
continued.
Neither of the state's witnesses to the incident (a store manager
and the victim) was able to identify the respondent in court or to de-
scribe in even minimal detail what anyone but the would-be thief had
done to further the crime. Despite these proof problems for the state,
it was clear that a second individual had participated in the crime, and
the respondent's statement, taken under extremely non-coercive cir-
cumstances, implicated him. Accordingly, the judge prefaced the clos-
ing arguments by saying, "The question is, based on the testimony,
he's guilty of something. What is it? That's what I want to hear your
argument" [sic]. 3 7 The judge rejected the state's claim that the vic-
tim's injuries-a brief concussion and a strained neck-constituted
the "substantial bodily injury" required for Assault in the Second De-
gree and instead found the respondent guilty of Assault in the Third
Degree.
2. A Domestic Disturbance38
In the other juvenile court case to be discussed in this Article, a
teenage girl was charged with two counts: Malicious Mischief in the
Third Degree (Domestic Violence) and Assault in the Fourth Degree
(Domestic Violence). 39 Both charges arose from a single incident that
36 Descriptions of this trial are based on the author's observations of portions of the
trial, review of pertinent filings, and review of the official audio recording. A copy of the
audio recording is on file with the author.
37 Audio tape: Transcript of Record at Disk 4, 32:12, State of Washington v. K.K. (19xx)
(No. 09-9-xxxxx-01) (copy of recording on file with author) [hereinafter Safeway Theft].
Juvenile offender proceedings in Washington are open to the public, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.140(6) (2008), and case information and offenders' records are available on the
Internet. A youth may, however, have her record sealed after the passage of a designated
period of time. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.50.050(11) (2008). In order to prevent the unfor-
tunate result that this Article could preserve information that is one day removed from
public records, the author has chosen not to include a case number or the Respondent's
name.
38 All references to what happened in this trial are drawn from the author's review of
the official audio recording of the trial. A copy of the audio recording is on file with the
author.
39 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.48.090, 9A.36.041 (2008).
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had occurred in the youth's home. The respondent in this case, whom
I will call Michelle, 40 was a fifteen-year-old girl. The complaining wit-
ness in the case was Michelle's mother, Deborah. The state's other
witnesses were Michelle's older brother, David (himself also a teen-
ager), and one of the responding police officers. A third-year law stu-
dent represented the state at this trial.41 Michelle was represented by
an attorney from a non-profit public defense firm.42 This attorney had
been a member of the bar for slightly more than two years at the time
the trial began. She had started working in juvenile court fairly re-
cently, after several months representing clients in misdemeanor do-
mestic violence cases in criminal court, cases in which her clients had
the right to a jury trial. The judge had served more than ten years on
the bench, preceded by work for a public defense firm and also in the
office of the state Attorney General.
Michelle's mother and brother both testified that in an emotional
outburst, Michelle slammed a closet door in her bedroom so hard that
it fell off its hinges and on top of her. The mother testified that she
entered the bedroom and found Michelle lying underneath the door.
At first glance, she thought Michelle was in danger of injury, but she
could not help her because Michelle was kicking wildly from beneath
the door. In an effort to quiet the kicking, the mother picked up a
hanger and "poked" at her daughter's feet. Once out from under the
door, Michelle aggressively snatched the hanger from her mother and
slashed at her with it, causing an injury the mother discovered only
later, after retreating to the bathroom.
The substance of the mother's testimony was dubiously melodra-
matic at several points, and defense counsel's cross-examination
showed her to be inconsistent-with her own prior statements and
with her son's later testimony. However, the desperate power of her
40 Audio tape: Transcript of Record, State of Washington v. X.X. (19xx) (No. 09-9-
xxxxx-01) (copy of recording on file with author) [hereinafter Domestic Disturbance]. In
the interest of protecting the Respondent in this case from having her juvenile court his-
tory disclosed, see infra note 37, the author will refer to her and her family members with
fictional names.
41 Washington Admission to Practice Rule 9 authorizes students who have obtained
two-thirds of the credits necessary to graduate from law school to engage in the limited
practice of law under supervision. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACnCE R. 9 (2009). "Rule 9"
interns working for the state are permitted to litigate juvenile court misdemeanor trials
such as this one without in-court supervision provided they have previously been super-
vised in court for at least one trial.
42 King County contracts with four non-profit firms to provide indigent defense ser-
vices. The firms with Juvenile Court contracts each have units of attorneys specifically
assigned there. Except for the supervisor, attorneys typically rotate through such assign-
ments for anywhere from six to eighteen months. Many of these attorneys are relatively
junior, but it is not unusual for attorneys with considerable experience to return to the
Juvenile Unit later in their careers.
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911 call, which the prosecution played during her testimony, was un-
deniable. Moreover, her demeanor on the stand showed no lingering
resentment or hostility toward her daughter. In fact, she expressed
concern for Michelle and evinced humility about the limits of her own
memory. In sum, the mother was a complicated figure who presented
a puzzle for both lawyers. Quite low-key in manner, the son, David,
was a more compelling witness than his mother. As noted above and
described in more detail within, there were non-trivial inconsistencies
between his testimony and that of his mother. In the end, however,
the court found them inconsequential. Rejecting the defense attempts
to (a) raise a reasonable doubt based on the inconsistencies and (b)
paint the mother as the aggressor in the incident and claim self-de-
fense, 43 the judge found the respondent guilty of both counts.
3. A Losing Battle
In 2006, Seattle's men's professional basketball team, the Super-
sonics, was losing games and money in large quantities, while fans and
public officials were losing interest in the team. Attendance was
dwindling, and the team's efforts to obtain public funds to construct a
new arena had failed. Principal-owner and local businessman Howard
Schultz sold the team to a group from Oklahoma City. As Schultz had
before them, the new owners failed to obtain public financing for a
new arena in or around Seattle. 44 In September 2007, the owners filed
for arbitration, seeking to be released from a contractual obligation to
play all home games in Seattle's Key Arena. This relief would free the
team to begin playing in Oklahoma City. The following week, the
Seattle City Attorney filed suit in state court, seeking an order of spe-
cific performance of the home game provision of the lease. The team
removed the case to federal court, and it was scheduled for trial in
June 2008 before United States District Judge Marsha Pechman. The
City was represented at trial by the K&L Gates law firm, and the
Oklahoma-based ownership group (its corporate name, Professional
Basketball Club LLC, was shortened in most accounts to "PBC") was
represented by Byrnes & Keller, a small Seattle-based firm.
At trial,45 the City presented a lineup of public officials, starting
43 The respondent also testified, albeit in highly cursory fashion, responding affirma-
tively to sharply leading questions by counsel intended to establish that she was in fear of
her mother throughout the episode. Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, Disk 2, 33:50.
44 State officials refused to approve such funding, and Seattle voters approved an initia-
tive making it extremely difficult to use city funds for arena construction. Seattle Times
Staff, Seattle and the Sonics, THE SEArrLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://seattle
times.nwsource.comlhtml/localnews/2003990399websonicstimelineO3.html.
45 The trial record for most of the proceedings was made available on various media
websites including that of The Seattle Times (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com). Copies of
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with the Mayor of Seattle and including others responsible for the
day-to-day administration of the Seattle Center, the city-owned plaza
that is home to the Key Arena, the Space Needle, and other public
cultural amenities and landmarks. These officials detailed the history
of the public-private partnership that had resulted in the current lease,
as well as the place that the arena and the team occupied within the
array of cultural activities and entities that constituted the Center's
work. The City also presented economists who described the pro-
jected adverse economic impact of the team's departure. In one of the
trial's more off-beat yet telling moments, the City called author and
passionate Sonics fan, Sherman Alexie, who testified about the emo-
tional impact the team's departure would have on him and other fans
and what it would mean for the City's identity. Alongside this story of
promises made and broken, the City's trial team developed a separate
and more biting theme, portraying the new ownership group as having
been intent from the outset on moving the team to their hometown.46
Unsurprisingly, PBC's litigation team called an expert economist
to rebut the City's economist. The Mayor's testimony for the City was
offset by that of a member of the City Council who expressed skepti-
cism about the financial benefits professional sports franchises pro-
vide to local economies. 47 Forced to acknowledge that the lease did
provide for specific performance and contained the home game provi-
sion, PBC's legal team demonstrated, often through the City's own
witnesses, that the lease was no longer capable of meeting the objec-
tives contemplated by either party at the time of its execution. The
lease's obsolescence, they argued, meant that the City should receive
financial relief but not specific performance. Equally important, the
PBC litigation team shifted attention away from their clients' provoca-
tive emails about moving the team and onto the questionable tactics
all transcripts of other trial-related documents cited in this Article are on file with the
author.
46 In one of many emails disclosed during discovery, Clayton Bennett, the leader of the
new ownership group described himself to his partners as "a man possessed" with getting
the team to Oklahoma as soon as possible. See Josh Feit, Basketball Court Day 2: The
Bennett E-mails & Tim Ceis on Key Arena, June 17, 2008, available at http://slog.thestran-
ger.comI2008/06fbasketball-court-day_2-thebennett-email ("Is there any way to move
here [Oklahoma City] for next season or are we doomed to have another lame duck season
in Seattle?" Ward wrote. Bennett replied: "I am a man possessed! Will do everything we
can. Thanks for hanging with me boys, the game is getting started!" Ward: "That's the
spirit!! I am willing to help any way I can to watch ball here [in Oklahoma City] next year."
McClendon: "Me too, thanks Clay!"). In his deposition, Aubrey McLendon, one of the
other members of the ownership group, acknowledged sending an email to Bennett in
which he stated: "The truth is we did buy [the Sonics] with the hope of moving to
Oklahoma City." Deposition of Aubrey McClendon at 184, City of Seattle v. The Profes-
sional Basketball Club, LLC (No. C07-1620 MJP) (on file with author).
47 Council Member Nick Licata testified on June 20, 2008, and June, 26, 2008.
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of a group of local business and civic leaders who had positioned
themselves to purchase the team if the court prevented the early move
and the Oklahoma-based group decided to sell. This local group, led
by a developer named Matt Griffin, included Microsoft executive
Steven Ballmer. (During trial, they were referred to as the Griffin or
Ballmer group.) At an early meeting, former Sonics player and execu-
tive Wally Walker had shown the group members a PowerPoint pres-
entation recommending a "pincer movement" in which litigation
would "increase the pain" for PBC such that they would be willing to
sell to the Griffin group. As revealed at trial, the title slide referred to
this approach as "Poisoning the Well."' 48 The unseemly character of
these machinations undermined the City's claim to be the wronged
party and manifestly alienated the judge. Her evident displeasure un-
doubtedly influenced the lawyers as they engaged in final settlement
discussions. Minutes before the judge was to announce her ruling,49
the parties announced a settlement under which the team would be
permitted to play in Oklahoma City beginning in the fall of 2008,
under a different name, after paying specified sums to the City.
C. The Narrative Capacity of These Cases
Individually and together, these cases are worthwhile objects of
study for developing a broadly applicable appreciation of the narra-
tive dynamics of bench trial lawyering. Juvenile court cases are espe-
cially good vehicles for exploring the narrative potential of bench
trials, because juvenile court dockets contain many cases with fact pat-
terns similar to those seen in criminal court. Generally speaking, the
same substantive and procedural rules apply, except for the right to a
jury.50 The .Shoplifting/Assault trial involves a common form of
youthful criminality, but the age of the accused is fairly insignificant
for legal purposes. Thus, this case offers a helpful, if elementary, ex-
ample of the narrative implications of substituting a judge for the jury
as finder of fact.
Intra-family assault cases such as Michelle's have become more
48 A copy of the presentation is on file with the author.
49 The trial began on June 15, 2008, and the attorneys delivered closing arguments on
June 26, 2008. At the end of the closings, the judge announced that she would rule on July
2 at 4:00. The settlement was announced shortly after 4:00 on the 2nd.
50 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (asserting that juveniles have no con-
stitutional right to a jury trial). Some states provide for juries by statute. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 55A (2009); see also In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008) (asserting
that changes to juvenile code making juvenile justice system more punitive and less reha-
bilitative require recognition of constitutional right to jury); cf State v. Chavez, 180 P.3d




common in juvenile courts in recent years. Because the youth's age,
dependent status, and relationship with the parent/alleged-victim are
central to such cases, one might expect such cases to develop differ-
ently from the criminal court domestic violence cases with which they
have superficial similarities. Integrating the modern criminal justice
approach to domestic violence within the traditional juvenile justice
paradigm-in which the court, the legal fact-finder, also acts as a sub-
stitute parent 51-is not simple. The trial discussed in this Article illus-
trates how role-derived preconceptions hinder both judges and
lawyers in crafting a narrative response that can encompass this
complexity.
Whereas the juvenile court cases are good subjects for this in-
quiry because of their substantive overlap with criminal cases, the
Sonics trial provides valuable contrast across many dimensions. Most
obviously, working with an example of commercial litigation makes it
possible to test the reach and power of bench-trial narrative theory
outside the criminal context. In addition, the prominence of the Son-
ics trial enriches the inquiry. Most trial lawyers spend their entire ca-
reers without trying a case amid the sort of tumult and scrutiny that
surrounded the Sonics trial. Any framework for describing trials must
be able to survive, and also survive without, the media spotlight and
its potentially energizing and distorting influence. Finally, including
the Sonics case alongside the juvenile cases offers an opportunity to
examine the effect of lawyer experience and status on narrative choice
and development. Juvenile court is often a training ground for law-
yers. Federal litigation is seen by many as a professional pinnacle.
The lawyers in the Sonics trial were considerably more experienced
than those in the juvenile court cases. In some instances, this factor
can be seen influencing choices the lawyers made and the judges' re-
sponses to them. Strikingly, in other instances, the patterns of narra-
tive possibility and peril look very much alike.
Finally, the three cases under review present a continuum with
respect to judicial intervention.5 2 The judge in the shoplifting/assault
case dominated the trial, leaving little room for the lawyers to make
their mark. As frustrating as this may have been for the lawyers, the
outsize nature of this judicial performance provides a valuable oppor-
tunity to observe the judicial mind during trial. The other juvenile
court judge appeared to approach the domestic assault case from a
great distance, making it difficult for the lawyers to reach him. Even
51 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967).
52 For support of the notion that this variability is general and not a random attribute of
this set of cases, see Doran, supra note 12, at 40 (identifying "considerable variation in
judicial style" among judges in Northern Ireland security case bench trials).
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so, the lawyers had ample material from which to draw complex nar-
ratives. The judge in the Sonics trial fell comfortably in the center,
pushing, testing, but also following the lawyers. 53 The lawyers had
creative space in which to develop the multi-layered narratives
previewed above, addressing the specifics of the lease, the behavior of
the parties, the significance of the conflict, and the court's proper role
in it. Taken together, the three cases showcase the challenge of man-
aging the near-constant buzz of signals flowing between lawyers and
judges as a bench trial unfolds.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: How LAWYERS ENACT NARRATIVE IN
OPENING STATEMENT
The importance of opening statements is well-settled within both
the trial literature54 and the culture of trial lawyers. Opening state-
ment also stands as the lawyer's moment of maximum command over
the trial narrative. Professor Robert Burns captures this well when he
observes that "[b]y the time closing argument begins, each lawyer can-
not but be aware that the enabling simplicities of opening have largely
disappeared. ' 55 At the moment of opening, the trial is a field full of
promise. No witnesses have failed to testify as expected. The judge
has not unexpectedly foreclosed any lines of examination or argument
upon which the lawyer's case depends. The lawyer is free to lay out
her vision of the case and try to draw her audience into it. If simple,
in Burns' sense, when compared to closing, bench trial openings are
challenging when compared to their jury trial analogs. Jurors are gen-
erally trial novices, eagerly awaiting the entertaining lawyer story-
telling characteristic of an effective opening. In contrast, judges are
likely see the lawyers' openings, however diverting, as the only thing
standing between them and the evidence upon which their decisions
should rest. 56 Judges are unlikely to interrupt an opening statement,
but may quickly dismiss lawyers they believe to be off-track. Moreo-
53 See id. at 43 (calling upon judges in bench trials to exercise "relative passivity" as an
intermediate approach to intervention that signals to lawyers without supplanting them).
54 See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: LAW SCHOOL EDITION 341 (2d ed.
2004) ("This moment is crucial since the mental image that the jurors hold while hearing
the evidence will directly influence the way they interpret it."); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 61 (5th ed. 2000).
55 BURNS, supra note 8, at 67.
56 See Robert E. Cartwright, Jr., "Bench Trial Acumen"-To Bench or Not To Bench-
That Is The Question, in WINTER 2004 ATLA-CLE 93 (2004). Cartwright believes that
lawyers need to "[d]eliver a concise, logical and organized presentation [as][t]he Court is
likely to be less tolerant of a rambling, storytelling approach to opening statement that
some lawyers utilize." Id. Even so, he asserts, they should not shrink from advocacy.




ver, as seasoned lawyers, judges have been trained and conditioned to
identify, almost immediately and instinctively, the moment when an
advocate veers off-track, at least as they have plotted that track.
The scope and duration of the openings in the domestic assault
case and the Sonics trial differed in predictable ways given the differ-
ences in the volume of evidence, the experience of the lawyers, and
the stature of the forum. The relatively new lawyers in the one-day
juvenile court trial delivered openings that were quite brief, but, as
will be shown, not unduly so. Each lawyer told a complete and coher-
ent story. The experienced lawyers in the longer and more complex
federal trial gave commensurately longer and more comprehensive
openings. The lawyers in the Safeway trial waived opening entirely, a
decision described in more detail in Part V. Analysis of the narrative
structure of the openings in the two trials which featured them and the
decision to waive in the third case reveals a common dynamic: open-
ing statement (or the lack thereof) established the terms of the rela-
tionship between lawyer and judge that would inform each trial's
unfolding narratives. The lines laid down at the outset of the case
reappeared throughout the trial, informing the content and also the
tenor of the ultimate decision. In this way, the cases reflect the core
principle from the narrative literature that the manner in which the
stories are told can be even more significant than their content.
A. The Power of Patterns
The domestic assault trial provides an especially vivid illustration
of the importance of recognizing how a particular case fits within the
patterns etched into the judge's mind by prior trials. Each opening in
this trial fit squarely within such patterns, amplifying the effects of the
lawyers' words and images, in ways intended and accidental, beneficial
and counter-productive. In an opening that lasted only fifty-two
seconds,57 the prosecutor presented the main characters, told her
story, and primed the judge to act. She offered a simple plot: "The
respondent slammed her closet door, breaking it off its hinges," and
then slashed her mother with a hanger. "Devastated," the mother/
victim "was still sobbing and crying" 58 when the police arrived. With-
out saying much and without the need to say more, the prosecutor
unveiled a very powerful script, pulsing with the tension between a
common state of affairs (a slammed door in a teenager's bedroom)
57 This is not intended as criticism. The student-prosecutor handled herself profession-
ally throughout the trial, an accomplishment in itself. Fairly prosaic, this opening was quite
similar to those the author has seen from juvenile court prosecutors with considerably
more experience.
58 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 1, 9:46-10:12.
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and the unusual denouement (the arrival of the police). The fact that
a mother called the police for protection from her own child sent the
unmistakable message that this was no ordinary tantrum.
Within the fifty-two seconds of her opening statement, the prose-
cutor recited the name of each offense twice, once at the beginning
and once at the end. She thus uttered the phrase "domestic violence"
four times in less than one minute.5 9 Doing so, she activated a power-
ful set of associations peculiar to this class of crimes (e.g., a history of
subordination, a cycle of power and control, an inability to escape). 60
Although this juvenile court trial did not contain evidence of any of
these features of domestic violence, 61 the prosecution stood to benefit
from the now well-established recognition that, for a long time, courts
and the rest of the justice system were too slow and timid in respond-
ing to domestic violence. 62 The prosecutor's repetition of the term
"domestic violence" implicitly raised the stakes for the judge. He
could protect the victim or ignore (and perhaps increase) the risk to
her, a risk made to seem graver because the prosecutor's opening of-
fered no context or precipitating event for the assault, suggesting that
raging adolescence defies explanation in court much as it does disci-
pline at home.63
More polished and powerful in delivery, defense counsel took a
strikingly similar substantive approach in opening. After suggesting
59 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.020 (2008) defines domestic violence to include specified
crimes between "family and household members," a class defined to include "persons who
have a biological or legal parent-child relationship."
60 The Domestic Abuse Intervention Project of Duluth, Minnesota is often cited with
developing the image of the Power and Control Wheel visually depicting the various forms
of abuse and domination thought to characterize may relationships marked by domestic
violence. See Domestic Abuse Intervention Programs, http://www.theduluthmodel.org/
wheelgallery.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
61 As the arrest rates for teenagers have declined over the past decade-and-a-half, par-
ent-on-child assaults have come to occupy a substantial portion of the cases remaining on
the dockets of many juvenile courts. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND ViCIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT (2006) ("[T]he rate of juve-
nile violent crime arrests has consistently decreased since 1994, falling to a level not seen
since at least the 1970s."). Conversations with juvenile defenders nationwide have con-
firmed the author's experience and observations regarding both the increasing frequency
of such prosecutions and their striking dissimilarity with incidents of domestic violence
assault between adults. In light of the societal interest in preserving ties between youth
and their families, even in most high-conflict parent-child relationships, the domestic vio-
lence framework, created as a means of ending relationships between adults, may be an
unhelpful way of approaching these cases.
62 See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 (1992).
63 In the even graver context of death penalty litigation, James Doyle has described
how "sometimes the absence of comprehensible motive ... is the prosecutor's most effec-
tive tool." James Doyle, The Lawyer's Art: "Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 417, 424-25 (1996).
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
that there would be little factual conflict between the parties, 64 coun-
sel sought to persuade the court that the mother had been the princi-
pal aggressor. As defense counsel framed the events, this simple
incident of domestic turmoil escalated only because the mother re-
sorted to violence, swinging a hanger at her daughter as she lay
trapped beneath the door and ordering her son, who was considerably
bigger than his sister, to subdue her with a "wrestling move." Beneath
the door and under attack, outnumbered and outsized, the girl had no
choice but to defend herself, and any injury she may have caused was
excusable. Just as the state offered no explanation for the daughter's
anger, the defense provided no explanation for the mother's extreme
aggression.
This similarity in tone and texture between the two openings
nearly suffocated the defense narrative. Engaging, as the state had, in
context-free finger-pointing, the defense forced the judge to choose
between the parent and the child as to who initiated the violence and
who would be telling the truth at trial. Even if the respondent had
been prepared to testify in more detail than she did, her chances
would not have been very good. Whether it is their distance from
adolescence, their repeated exposure to alleged youthful misconduct,
or other factors, judges seldom find youth credible when compared to
adults. More significantly, the narrative structure of the defense
opening unwittingly but unmistakably reinforced the state's invoca-
tion of the domestic violence paradigm. Adults charged in criminal
courts with domestic violence offenses frequently defend themselves
by raising the claim of self-defense and painting the alleged victim as
the aggressor. 65 Such claims, often made for want of any plausible
alternative, 66 likely have greater persuasive potential before a jury,
64 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 1, 11:11-33 ("Your honor.... what the
state has said, I actually agree with absolutely everything that she has mentioned. I do
think that the door did fall. The door actually fell on top of [Michelle]. And in the process,
while she had this door on top of her, Mom comes in and grabs the hanger and starts
hitting her on the legs while she has a door on top of her.").
65 See, e.g., State v. Hendricks, 787 A.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Vt. 2001) ("Ms. Lee claimed
that defendant grabbed her by the throat and banged her head against the wall.... Defen-
dant, however, stated that Ms. Lee had kicked him in the groin, bit his finger and hit him in
the head, and that he had merely pushed her away in self-defense.").
66 Provided there is sufficient proof of injury (rendering a claim of fabrication unavaila-
ble) and the defendant's involvement (dispatching any identification claim), there may be
little else the defense can argue in trying to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt. For an
example of the half-hearted, almost self-incriminating way in which such claims are often
raised, see State v. Watson, No. 22207-1-11I, 2004 Wash. Ct. App. WL 1730256 (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 3, 2004). In this case, a wife testifies that "[d]uring the argument, Mr. Watson
grabbed her by the throat and slammed the back of her head into a door jamb. Mr. Wat-
son then head-butted her and said, 'There, and now you can tell your mother she can pay
for a divorce."' Id. at *1. Husband testifies that "the contact was accidental and he was
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which sees but one such case, than before a judge, who has the oppor-
tunity to see a pattern develop. A former public defender, this judge
was likely keenly aware of how such a trial theory would be chosen
and thus especially skeptical of it.67
As is often the case, both attorneys in this trial presented the case
as an easy one, with an obvious resolution (each proposing a different
outcome, of course). However intuitively attractive, this approach to
advocacy will often prove counter-productive. Recent research into
judge's cognitive errors (which mirror those of the rest of us) reveals
the benefit of making decisions look difficult.68 When decisions ap-
pear to be easy, they will be made quickly, often by automatic think-
ing and shortcuts. Mere counter-arguments will not upset or forestall
a judge's automatic thinking. A lawyer must first recognize which side
stands to be on the losing end of the quick decision, a process that
requires a degree of pre-trial objectivity often hard to attain.69 Hav-
ing recognized this risk, the lawyer must avoid it by re-defining the
question before the court in a surprising way. As James Doyle has
observed in the context of representation in capital cases, "[t]he real
cure for stereotyped thinking is not the substitute of a different stereo-
type but a new way of looking at the world. ' 70 Answering an assault
charge with a self-defense claim, especially in a domestic violence
case, is utterly unsurprising.
Narrative lawyering theory offers guidance for lawyers seeking to
confound expectations and induce judges to suspend judgment and
break free of their habitual ways of thinking. Professor Amsterdam
writes that "narrative restores the mystery of the world."' 71 This is not
just acting in self-defense." Id. at *2.
67 See Leipold, supra note 2, at 162 (claiming that lawyers cite the concern that "judges
were more likely to 'know what we are up to' as one of the common reasons for rarely
opting for bench trials). The juvenile court judge in the instant case dismissed the sugges-
tion that the mother was the aggressor by pointing out that she was wrapped in a bath
towel during the incident and thus not "dressed for a fight." Domestic Disturbance, supra,
note 40, at Disk 2, 55:15-26. That the judge disposed of the self-defense claim so simply is
an indication of how little he made of it.
68 Guthrie, Blinking, supra note 9, at 15; see also Buis, supra note 8, at 182 (warning
that "a legal system where decisions flow easily from the 'sort' of situation it is, because of
relatively generalized and abstract features of situations, is a system where there will be
relatively little internal strife and correspondingly little justice").
69 See Alper, supra note 4, at 10 (proposing narrative as an alternative to an approach
in which lawyers seek merely "to confirm the most immediately obvious favorable
scenario").
70 Doyle, supra note 63, at 438.
71 Alper, supra note 4, at 10. For a different perspective on the challenge of developing
litigation approaches that can accommodate the mystery and complexity which emerge
from client narratives, see John Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation:
What Is a True Believer To Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLIN. L. REv.
85 (1999). In the cases Mitchell discusses, the lawyers struggled to find a way to make the
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mystery in the procedural sense of a whodunit, where one sets out on
a path confident that the answer lies at the end. Instead, it is mystery
in the sense of complexity, a recognition that individuals act within a
web of relationships and that their actions and motivations, are not
easily reduced to a formula. Defense counsel in the domestic assault
trial had the opportunity to invite the court to see the case as complex,
laced with mystery, and requiring cautious deliberation before judg-
ment. Counsel might have opened the trial by saying, "Being a teen-
ager is tough. One minute you're supposed to act independently, like
an adult, and the next minute, someone's saying, 'No, you're not ready
for that yet.' It's confusing, it's overwhelming, it's a mess. One of the
few things that may be harder than being a teen is being the parent of
a teen. Leave the kid alone and they wind up in trouble. Get too
close and you're smothering them. It's a wonder most families make
it through the storm, but they do. The family you will meet today has
weathered some of the storms of adolescence. This particular storm
hit them hard and tossed them around. It began when Michele
slammed her bedroom door too hard, it picked up steam when her
mother grabbed a hanger and swung it at her, and it ended some time
later that evening, with the police on the scene, the daughter de-
pressed, and the mother bleeding from her elbow and sobbing.
Neither mother nor daughter made their best decisions during this in-
cident, but neither one committed a crime."
Instead of pitting the mother and daughter against each other as
both lawyers did, this approach recognizes their common goal, the
daughter's progression to adulthood. This approach offers the possi-
bility of unraveling the state's "domestic violence" paradigm. The
family-in-a-storm metaphor brings to the surface the fact that society
wants this mother and daughter to preserve and improve their rela-
tionship, whereas with adults involved in domestic violence, society
likely prefers that the relationship end.72 The suggested opening cre-
ates equivalences between the daughter and mother: each commits an
act which escalates the tension, each ends up in an unhappy state. The
judge does not need to jump in between them. Instead, he needs to
clients' narratives comprehensible to jurors from a culture different from the clients'. Id.
at 116. In other words, the challenge was the opposite of the one described here, where
lawyers seek to induce judges to look past what they think of as familiar and see the
particularity.
72 See Edward A. Dauer, Reflections on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Creative Problem
Solving, and Clinical Education in the Transactional Curriculum, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
483, 497 (2005) ("Creativity in legal problem solving, and the emotional intelligence that is
an indispensable part of it, are enhanced by processes like metaphor."); Eastman, supra
note 13, at 815 ("If the metaphor is new and fits, it can change the reality before the
judge.").
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stand beside them. This is a far superior vantage point for appreciat-
ing them as individuals and understanding the complexity of their re-
lationship. Of course, identifying this narrative goal presents the
lawyer with the more challenging task of creating a rhetorical bridge
between the life and world of the judge and those of this troubled
teen.73
By beginning the opening with the daughter's peace-breaking act
of slamming the door, defense counsel would signal to the judge that
she is prepared to acknowledge her client's faults and present a three-
dimensional picture of the family, as opposed to the caricatures of rag-
ing teen and demonic parent which were presented in the actual
trial. 74 This subtle move has the potential to drastically alter the trial's
alignment, shifting the way the judge is positioned vis-h-vis the re-
spondent and counsel. Fulfilling her role as her client's champion, but
in an unconventional way, counsel would be inviting the judge to join
her in the task of appreciating the mystery within the life of this family
while also suggesting that their experience is not so bizarre or atypical
as to be beyond comprehension by those willing to look closely.75 In-
stead, as will be revealed more fully in Part III, defense counsel be-
came enmeshed in a civil, but unrelieved, conflict with the judge as
she attempted to attack the mother and wholly exonerate the
daughter.
B. Defining Roles
Unlike the lawyers in the domestic assault case, the lawyers in the
Sonics trial used their opening statements to present starkly different
characterizations of the dispute and the role the judge should play in
resolving it. Paul Lawrence, 76 lead attorney for the City, presented
73 See BENNETr, supra note 5, at 171 ("[E]ven the construction of a coherent story may
not guarantee a just outcome if the teller and the audience do not share the norms, exper-
iences, and assumptions necessary to draw connections among story elements.").
74 Meyer makes a similar point in his analysis of a closing argument in Meyer, Desper-
ate 1, supra note 24, at 741 ("The prosecutor's version of Louis Failla, a flat and sinister
caricature, was far more a lifeless cartoon than Donovan's literal cartoon representation of
Failla.").
75 See BURNS, supra note 8, at 44 ("[A] theory is superior if people act 'normally."').
76 Referring to the lawyers in this case by name is not intended to signal any lesser
respect for the lawyers in the other cases discussed here, whose names are not used. The
Sonics trial received extensive media coverage, and the lawyers themselves have been the
subject of considerable public discussion. A year after the trial's conclusion, the Summer
2009 issue of Washington Law and Politics ran a cover story, with a photograph of Brad
Keller, in which it identified him as the lawyer whose "courtroom performance helped
send off the Sonics." Michael Hood, Somebody's Got To Do It, Summer 2009 WASH. L. &
POL. Cover (2009). Moreover, the actions of Slade Gorton, one of the city's pre-trial law-
yers, became a prominent issue in the case. Finally, the contrast between the competing
firms in this trial likewise informs the analysis of the case. See infra note 110. The deci-
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the dispute as so simple that it scarcely needed much of a trial at all.
After all, "the lease says what it says." 77 The lease contained one
clause requiring the team to play its home games at Key Arena and
another entitling the City to specific performance in the event of
breach. Reading the two together would lead the judge to the only
possible ruling. This case would not require complicated legal re-
search or analysis, the resolution of conflicting memories, or the inter-
pretation of ambiguous events. As counsel set it out, it seemed almost
a shame that the judge would need to devote her time and energy to
so ministerial a task.
With the first line of his opening, Lawrence signals respect for the
court's distance from and ability to see beyond the passions that had
dominated public discussion of the case. "This is a case," he begins
"about the city of Seattle's policy decision to specifically enforce their
lease with the Seattle Supersonics .... "78 Consistent with this framing
of the conflict, Lawrence presents the City as a bureaucratic entity.
Before the lease was ever signed, "[t]he City of Seattle made a policy
decision that they would invest in building a new... facility. ' 79 In the
trial brief filed with the court, this same decision had been presented
thus, "In 1994, the city determined to pledge more than 80 million tax-
payer dollars" toward the renovation of the arena. In the narrative
world that counsel is inviting the court to enter, the City is a plodding
bureaucratic beast with the heart of a cautious lawyer. It does not
take rash actions (e.g., investing or even deciding to invest); it makes
"policy decisions." It does not make commitments or pledges without
first determining to do so. This portrayal characteristically presents
sions in this Article regarding naming the lawyers are consistent with the general narrative
literature. Alper and his co-authors, see Alper, supra note 4, do use names in their discus-
sion of the high-profile trial of the officers accused of assaulting Rodney King. Meyer
likewise refers to the defense lawyer he profiles in his series of articles by name. See supra
note 24. The case Meyer analyzed involving organized crime figures received some media
attention, at least locally. See, e.g., Meyer, Desperate I, at 723, n.8. Also the lawyer, Jer-
emiah Donovan, spoke publicly about the trial in a symposium on narrative theory. Jer-
emiah Donovan, Some Off-The-Cuff Remarks About Lawyers As Storytellers, 18 VT. L.
REV. 751 (1994). In contrast, Amsterdam and Hertz, do not use names in their article
analyzing closing arguments in a trial in which the identity of the parties or the lawyers was
not significant for their analysis. Amsterdam, supra note 21.
77 Transcript of Record at 6:7-8, City of Seattle v. Prof'l Basketball Club, No. C07-
01620-MJP, 2008 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Wash. 2008) (No. C07-01620-MJP) [hereinafter Basket-
ball Transcript].
78 Id. at 4:15-16.
79 Id. at 5:1-3. (Throughout this Article, the author has used italicized font to indicate
emphasis that he either heard in the spoken voice on the cited audiotape or in live pro-
ceedings, [in the Safeway Theft and Domestic Disturbance matters] or that he adds pres-
ently for his own emphasis when quoting from available transcripts, in the Basketball
matter. Thus, all emphases in quoted trial text are the author's, and are designated as such
with "emphasis added.").
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the crucial moment, the creation of the lease, in equally cool, lawyerly
terms: "[t]o effectuate this decision and the investment of taxpayer
dollars and taxpayer credit, the City entered into a lease. '' 80 "Effectu-
ate" is not a word for a jury opening,81 and it does not offer much for
most bench trials. In sound and sense, however, it belongs in this
opening. Counsel's methodical, anti-dramatic introduction presents
the trial as the culmination of a process set in place long ago, by the
lawyers who drafted the lease. All that remains is for the judge, the
lawyer-in-charge, to bring the case to its preordained completion.
Like the judge, the trial lawyers themselves have little to do. Better
they should stay out of the way and keep the litigation from devolving
into a distracting sideshow.
This characterization ultimately shackles counsel, creating the im-
age of an enervated, rather then deserving, client. Referring to the
City's interactions with the new ownership group, Lawrence states,
"[t]he City... has made clear from day one.., that the City intended
to make a policy decision to enforce the lease. .. 2 Perhaps if in front
of a jury, counsel would have said, "The City would fight to keep its
team." Saying "the City would enforce its rights" would at least have
suggested a readiness to fight. Making "a policy decision to enforce
the lease" is more indirect. It places the decision-maker behind a
desk, far from any contest. "Intending" to make a policy decision to
enforce one's rights, the City appears to be confined to the sterile
realm of thought.
This dispassionate approach created an emotional void,83 as be-
came evident when counsel attempted, toward the end of the opening,
to fill it. Shortly before reprising his opening line about the City's
policy decision and then sitting down, Lawrence previewed the testi-
mony of Sherman Alexie, acclaimed author and passionate Sonics fan:
"As writer Sherman Alexie will testify, the health and pride of a city
depends on more than its politics, it also needs art, and, yes, it needs
athletics. A great city needs to work on its soul, mind and body. A
great city needs to embrace as much greatness as it possibly can."'84
This talk of "greatness" in its various forms clashes starkly with the
tone, grammar, and vocabulary of the opening to this point. One can
80 Id. at 5:16-18.
81 See LUBET, supra note 54, at 377 ("[S]imple language is generally the best .... Your
opening statement can be sophisticated without relying upon language that you won't hear
on the evening news.").
82 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 7:4-6.
83 See BURNS, supra note 8, at 36 (describing case theory as a double-helix, one strand
dominated by narrative and the other by logic). The city's logic-heavy approach left its
narrative strand under-developed.
84 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 15:23-25, 16:1-2.
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imagine an opening in which the City was presented from the outset
as a vibrant community of diverse individuals with an array of talents
and interests, with sports arenas as among the vital communal gather-
ing points. That is not the course Lawrence chose, and, as Alexie him-
self noted in post-trial commentary, there was no room for him in
Lawrence's city of policy 85 nor for his testimony in the structure of the
trial Lawrence erected early in the opening.8 6
Remaining in the more animated mode he shifted to late in the
opening, Lawrence vigorously and pre-emptively defended the "civic
leaders" working to keep the team in Seattle: "There is nothing
wrongful about what they did. There is nothing wrongful about trying
to keep a team in Seattle. There is nothing wrongful about the City en-
forcing the lease rights it has bargained for. '87 The three-part refrain
(with repetition joined to slight variation) is an ancient rhetorical
technique which has become a standard part of the trial lawyer's rep-
ertoire.8 8 In this instance, however, the move may have inadvertently
undermined counsel's case. Like the reference to Alexie's testimony,
this passage creates dissonance with the core of counsel's opening.
Throughout the opening, counsel has sought to focus on the transac-
tion that started the process (i.e., the creation of the lease) and not the
litigation that is ending it. In tone and substance, counsel had made
the trial seem a mere formality. But here, toward the end, he adopts
the language of a hotly contested trial. Because of her familiarity with
courtroom rituals and styles, a judge would be far more likely than a
jury to register the significance of this change in tone. The judge
likely believed that good lawyers and good businessmen would not
waste their time, money, and energy on an utterly unworthy lawsuit,
especially one in which they will have to persuade her and not a jury. 9
This late change in tone likely further undermined the cut-and-dried
85 Sherman Alexie, Sixty-One Things I Learned During the Sonics Trial: A Sonics Love
Story, THE STRANGER, June 29, 2008, http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/Content?oid=
631015&hp ("The sportswriters who liked my testimony and press conference ... were
happy to note that I introduced emotion into the trial. Isn't it strange that we have to
highlight the introduction of emotion into a gathering?").
86 The judge deemed Alexie's testimony insubstantial. Basketball Transcript, supra
note 77, at 1113:22-25 ("I don't know that I have ever seen any case law that basically talks
about does the city shed tears. . . .In other words, can a corporate entity have senti-
ment?"); see Cartwright, supra note 56, at 93 ("[Judges] are not likely to forgive perceived
ploys to elicit sympathy.").
87 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 14:5-8.
88 Historically referred to as the tricolon, this device has been called the "rule of three"
in the modern advocacy literature. See, e.g., Murray Ogborn, Making Your Case Come to
Life: Storytelling and Theme Creation, 1 ANN. 2001 ATLA-CLE 189 (2001).
89 Often, the accused in a juvenile or criminal bench trial is not paying for counsel, due
to indigence, and stands to gain little by pleading guilty due to the narrow range of possible
sentences. Thus, judges might not make the same assumption in such cases.
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approach encapsulated in the notion that "the lease says what it says."
Moreover, the lawyerly defensiveness of the City's claim that those
affiliated with it did "nothing wrongful" only reinforced the notion
that there was more to the story than counsel had been telling. In this
manner, the City's opening actually set the stage for its opponent, un-
intentionally priming the judge to want to hear more about the dis-
pute, to see what lay beneath the placid surface counsel had initially
set out.
Brad Keller, lead counsel for the owners, also began his opening
talking about the lease and sounding like a lawyer (in the pejorative
sense): "The evidence is going to show that there were two funda-
mental premises that underlay this lease back in 1994."9o However, as
he set out the premises, Keller invited the judge to see the case-and
the roles of counsel and the court-very differently than his counter-
part had, achieving an immediacy and force that propelled his case
throughout. The first premise was that "the City of Seattle wanted a
15-year commitment by the Sonics to play their home games here."9a
He does not merely endorse his opponent's principal claim; he an-
nounces to the court that he is doing so. "That's right, your Honor, I
just said that back in 1994 the home game provision was an important
provision in this lease."'92 Conceding prominently, Keller sends the
message that he is willing to acknowledge his side's weaknesses and
that he will not fight merely for the sake of fighting, nor try to obscure
that which is plain.93 He is facing the situation squarely, exactly as (he
need not say) the court will. Keller may not have anticipated that
Lawrence would end his opening on the overreaching note that the
City's civic leaders had done "nothing wrongful," but he certainly
benefitted from the contrast as he moved forward to demonstrate that
a just resolution to this far-from-simple case would demand that the
judge exercise her judgment and not merely her rubber stamp.
Having staked a claim to the trial's middle ground and the judge's
full attention, Keller unveiled his second premise: that, to be meaning-
ful to either party, the lease had to be economically feasible. This was
just as obvious, although unstated, as the clearly-stated home game
90 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 16:16-17.
91 Id. at 16:18-19.
92 Id. at 16:20-21.
93 In an interview with the author, Keller suggested that a lawyer must build a bench
trial opening from the weakest point in his/her case because that is the place the judge is
likely to engage it most vigorously. Interview with Bradley S. Keller, Partner, Byrnes &
Keller, LLP, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 15, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Keller
Interview]; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE
ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 21 (2008) ("Yield indefensible terrain-ostentatiously....
Raise [weak points] candidly and explain why they are not dispositive.").
Fall 2009]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
provision. Keller's language here opens up the narrative that will
dominate the rest of his case. "These two underpinnings of this lease,
15 years of home games and having a competitive NBA arena, they
went hand in hand back in 1994. And they remain joined at the hip
today. ' 94 With "hand in hand" and "joined at the hip," Keller has left
the lawyer-talk behind. He could be explaining his case to a jury or
even a bar full of Sonics fans.95 As the premises are paired, so are the
parties: "You know, everyone always thinks in the beginning the mar-
riage will last, and everyone hopes that it will last."' 96 The case is no
longer merely a contract dispute between the "First-class charter city"
and the "limited liability corporation" of the official caption. Instead,
the court confronts the saga of two groups of people who came to-
gether to make something special and enduring, in other words, some-
thing worth fighting for. The hyper-analytic, narrative of the City's
opening has given way to the story of a relationship, albeit between
corporate entities, that is at its core about human interests, fraught
with human emotions, and ultimately shaped by the actions of human
beings.
Having invited the court to see the parties and the conflict in this
new light, Keller suggests that the failure of the relationship, like the
failure of so many marriages, was "not anyone's fault."' 97 Keller then
follows through with the marriage metaphor to illustrate the harm
that would come from granting the City's request. "In fact, the evi-
dence is going to show that this is a broken relationship that no longer
works. And like a broken marriage, the estranged parties shouldn't be
forced to continue under the same roof for two more years." 98 Here,
Keller suggests that the City is essentially asking the court to join it in
denying reality and prolonging the pain.99 Keller returns to the mar-
riage metaphor explicitly and implicitly throughout the opening.100
94 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 17:8-11.
95 The previously referenced photo of Keller on the cover of Washington Law and
Politics magazine, see supra note 76, shows him in a bar, in a traditional lawyer's suit, in a
crowd that includes one fan who is wearing a Sonics jersey.
96 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 17:18-19.
97 Id. at 17:23-25, 18:1 ("[L]ike many relationships do, this relationship broke down. It
failed as the years went by and it has just gotten worse and worse as time went by. Now,
you know there is a tendency when a relationship breaks down for one side to blame the
other. And I think you heard a little bit of the blame game this morning in the opening
comments of the City's counsel.").
98 Id. at 19:14-17.
99 For analysis of a similar rhetorical move, see Anthony Amsterdam, Thurgood Mar-
shall's Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in Brown, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 226, 235 (1993) (describ-
ing how Thurgood Marshall built his oral argument in Brown v. Board of Education
around the theme of segregation's irrationality, presenting it as "a vice that the Justices
themselves must either practice or put aside").
100 Setting up the parties' joint financial expectations, he states, "You will learn begin-
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Revisiting the absence of fault, Keller describes how "[t]he revenue
shortfalls you will see have caused a lot of economic hardship, hard-
ship on both the City and the team." 10 1 The parties have suffered
together, and that suffering is not due to profligate spending by one or
the other of them. Instead, the romantic vision underlying their "vir-
tually unprecedented" 10 2 partnership has been overtaken by events,
specifically, the creation of more luxurious and financially productive
sports facilities around the NBA and even in Seattle itself, as new
football and baseball stadiums were built with more conventional fi-
nancing arrangements. With this emphasis on the novelty of the Son-
ics lease, Keller suggests that the City and the team had
metaphorically eloped, i.e., taken a bold chance on something others
would have warned them against but that they were convinced would
work.
Having established the bond that had existed between the City
and the team, Keller then turns the spotlight on the hostile and there-
tofore hidden actions of Lawrence's "civic-minded citizens." Display-
ing the title slide from the "Poisoned Well" PowerPoint, Keller shows
something "wrongful," to use Lawrence's term: Wally Walker talking
to would-be local owners "about using this litigation and specific per-
formance as a means of inflicting financial pain as a way to impose,
quote, forced bleeding, close quote, to try to coerce a sale. '10 3 Ac-
cording to Keller, Walker had laid out a strategy in which "Mr. Gor-
ton and his crew would increase the pain of staying, both financial and
to the reputation of the PBC.' u0 4 Mr. Gorton, it is worth noting, is
Slade Gorton, former U.S. Senator and member of the 9/11 Commis-
sion. Here, Keller refers to him as if he were a mob boss looking to
improve the terms available to his client.105 This one slide balanced,
and perhaps even displaced, the PBC email messages about moving
ning in 2000 and 2001 the Sonics didn't generate the revenue contemplated, and on which
the parties based their 15 year vow." Basketball Transcript, supra note 77 at 20:25-21:2
(emphasis added); see Eastman, supra note 13, at 815 (saying that a metaphor "leaves
,unused parts' . . . unspoken but still available").
101 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 21:3-5.
102 Id. at 19:24.
103 Id. at 33:3-6.
104 Id. at 33:19-21.
105 For examples of the cultural resonance of mafia-related symbols and references, see
Alper, supra note 4, at 15. See also Meyer, Desperate III, supra note 24; Meyer, Desperate
II, supra note 24; Meyer, Desperate I, supra note 24. Keller does not use any words that
would run the comparison too far over the line and perhaps alienate the judge and bring
her to Gorton's defense. In this way, he achieves the delicate balance the authors in Stories
Told and Untold, Alper, supra note 4, at 186-99, appear to be seeking, perhaps in vain,
when they suggest that the prosecution in the King officers' trial might have benefitted by




the team that had caused such a stir in the media prior to trial and had
also consumed a good deal of the court's time.10 6
Keller ends, as he began, a self-appointed teller of uncomfortable
truths. He acknowledges the team's impending move as a loss for the
City and its people, but he calls upon the judge to see the situation
clearly:
You know, reminiscing about the glory days of yesteryear, when 30
years ago this team won an NBA title... that is not what the issue is
in this case. If civic pride has anything to do with this case, and we
submit it doesn't, the issue is what civic pride will there be over the
next two years when this will be a lame duck franchise? What civic
pride will there be as the steadily decreasing attendance continues
to decline when a few thousand dedicated but loyal fans sit in a
seemingly empty arena? What civic pride will there be as an already
disappointed fan base, and understandably so, becomes even more
embittered during what would be a prolonged lame duck
period?" 107
The judge cannot turn the team into champions, nor the lapsed fans
into ecstatic, hero-worshipping youngsters. Likewise, she cannot turn
the outmoded lease into a blueprint for economic success. However,
the absence of heroic possibilities does not leave the court without a
meaningful role to play. Keller ends his opening by urging the Court
to achieve what little good the trial makes possible: "This marriage is
broken. It has been broken for over five years. The City wants to in-
crease and force the bleeding. We say it is time to stop the
bleeding."10 8
Keller began the trial, the climax of an extremely contentious se-
quence of litigation, by bringing the court back to the moment when
the relationship between the two parties, the City and the team, was in
its earliest and happiest stages. He did not portray his clients as inno-
cent victims or their adversaries as unreconstructed villains. This
opening exemplifies lawyering with an appreciation for complexity, a
hallmark of a satisfying narrative. It also demonstrates that such law-
yering is not merely feasible in bench trials, it may be most effective in
them. Opening statement offers lawyers a brief but invaluable mo-
nopoly on the trial's communication channels. They risk squandering
106 This is a variation on, even an inversion of, the work of the lawyers for the Los
Angeles officers in deconstructing the videotape. See supra text accompanying note 33;
infra note 229. Keller re-categorizes the Oklahoman's emails as old news, less noteworthy
than the revelation of the machinations of the Seattle natives.
107 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 40:13-22. The "civic pride" refrain, id., offers
a three-point match for Lawrence's "nothing wrongful" litany, id. at 14:5-8, and sends a
clear signal to the judge that a true battle is on.
108 Id. at 42:2.
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it if they use it to claim a monopoly on virtue.10 9 Like jurors, judges
may organize facts in terms of stories, but, as legally-trained, oft-skep-
tical fault-finders, they have seen too much to fall for fairy-tales. This
opening also demonstrates the paradoxical power of the well-placed
concession. Keller's introductory concession did not lead into a timid
opening that balanced the two sides' claims. Instead, it served as the
jumping-off point for the bold claim that despite the specific perform-
ance clause, the City was entitled to financial relief only.110
Summing up the openings
The opening statements (or lack thereof) in the three trials sup-
port a typology with respect to the critical lawyering challenge identi-
fied in the Introduction-the ability to establish a shared command of
the trial with the judge. The prosecutor in the domestic assault case
stepped in just enough to point the judge where she wanted him to go
and then quickly stepped back, leaving him to head straight down the
path she had indicated. Defense counsel in that case stepped in boldly
and stood firm. As will be seen in the next section, this led to re-
peated friction and static between her and the judge. In the Sonics
trial, counsel for the City implicitly but clearly invited the judge to sit
back and let the lawyer show her exactly what she needed to know,
whereas counsel for the owners invited the judge to join him in the
attempt to look deep within the case and within the relationship be-
tween the parties to discover the truth. The lawyers in the Safeway
trial deferred entirely, setting the tone for a trial in which they served
largely as foils for the judge.'
109 See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 567 (warning against a case theory that casts the client in
"too pure a light").
110 By the end of the openings, one can see the clash reflecting the cultures of the re-
spective firms involved. Per its website, K&L Gates, the firm representing the city, "com-
prises 1,800 lawyers who practice in 33 offices located on three continents." K&L Gates,
http://www.klgates.com/about/ourfirm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). The firm offers six firm-
wide practice areas and "within each of those practice areas is a number of subject matter
and industry-based practice groups." Id. In contrast, Byrnes & Keller LLP, the firm repre-
senting PBC, consists of ten lawyers in one Seattle office. Byrnes & Keller LLP, http://
www.byrneskeller.com/profiles/attorney/byrnes.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). The tag-
line on its website reads: "A Firm of Experienced & Dedicated Trial Lawyers." Byrnes &
Keller LLP, http://www.byrneskeller.com/index2.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). The firm
promises "an alternative to the multi-layer management approach to commercial litigation
.... " Id. In light of these self-images, it seems almost natural that the city's opening
would spotlight the bureaucratic correctness of its case and the process by which the city
came to its decision, while the team's response would seek to humanize the parties and
localize the battle, guerilla style, to the terrain on which it stands the greatest chance, the
conduct of the city's leaders and associates.
111 This dynamic reached its high/low point when the prosecutor invited the victim off
the stand and into the well of the courtroom to demonstrate how he and the thief were
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III. ENTER THE JUDGE: NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT DURING
EXAMINATIONS AND ARGUMENTS
After opening, as witnesses are called and examined, judges make
their marks on bench trials through comments, questions, and rulings.
Of course, judges make all manner of mid-trial rulings before juries as
well, but these rulings stand merely as rules of law, determining what
evidence gets in or what argument is allowed. They reveal nothing
about the fact-finder's developing understanding of the case because
the jury, not the judge, finds the facts and renders judgment. Freed
from the concern over influencing the jury112 and concerned with the
quality of information upon which they will need to act, judges may
comment upon evidence and argument and may even intervene to ask
questions of witnesses and lawyers themselves. These interventions
are episodic; they may arise when a judge is surprised, confused, dis-
comfited or flustered by something counsel is attempting to do. Thus,
they will often be less direct but not necessarily less revealing of the
judge's thinking than the more structured give-and-take that occurs
during closing. Responding in the moment, counsel often lacks the
time to reflect upon1 13 the larger significance of these judicial inter-
ventions and how they open up or foreclose the trial's narrative pos-
sibilities. To differing extents and with markedly varied tones, the
judges in each of the three cases under review engaged in such prac-
tices, as will be described in this section.
A. (The Judge's) Past as Prologue
In their extensive analysis of the jury trial of the officers charged
with assaulting Rodney King, Amsterdam et al. assert that "[a] juror
does not merely 'find' facts but rather constructs a story based on the
narrative s/he hears and the worldview s/he holds. ' 114 The two juve-
positioned during his attempt to apply the handcuffs:
Prosecutor: (to witness) I know this is kind of awkward, but if you could just show
Judge: (in playful tone) Well, he has to tackle you first, counsel.
Prosecutor: (to witness) If you want to tackle me, go ahead.
Judge: (to witness) Now did you take him down real hard on the concrete?
Prosecutor: Let's start from the beginning when I'm down.
Judge: I love it when the lawyers volunteer to be guinea pigs, particularly the young
ones.
Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 3, 18:30.
112 See Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CoNN. L.
REV. 233 (2004).
113 With far fewer breaks (because there are no jurors in need of insulation from preju-
dicial information or in danger of information overload), bench trials move much more
rapidly than jury trials.
114 Alper, supra note 4, at 52; see also Miller supra 109, at 562 (citing to a juror's pub-
lished account in which he tells of how the jurors "told each other stories" because "the
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nile cases reviewed here demonstrate how judges are equally prison-
ers of their experience. Of course, that experience is quite different
from that of jurors. Jurors familiar with the subject matter of a trial
are typically screened out, whereas judges will often approach a case
in the light of other seemingly similar cases. The judge in the Safeway
trial was unusually quick to intervene in the trial, and in doing so, he
revealed preconceptions both slight and weighty. During a cross-ex-
amination of one of the investigating officers, the judge took over af-
ter defense counsel fumbled an attempt to establish the location of a
broken bottle the officer had found at the scene. Working from what
he "would expect from a Safeway," the judge completed the examina-
tion, and concluded by asking counsel, "That's what you wanted, isn't
it?"115
The fact that a judge has a mental schema for the layout of a
supermarket is neither surprising nor significant. Most jurors have
one as well. 116 The judge's preconceptions assume genuine impor-
tance, however, when they reveal that the judge has a script for trials
of this kind, i.e., an expectation that the lawyer will present a witness
to provide a certain kind of testimony.117 For example, during the
same direct exam described just above, the prosecutor had asked the
officer if she had been able to determine whether the bottle had been
broken through criminal activity. The judge had interrupted then as
well and admonished the prosecutor:
Counsel, she doesn't know how the bottle was used. I'm sure you're
going to have another witness tell how the bottle was used but...
she wasn't there to see it and I suspect that there's no way to tell
from a broken bottle how it got broken unless, forensically, she can
tell me and I'm suspecting she's not inclined to do that.118
disputed facts before us would make sense only if we could imagine the worlds around
them").
115 Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 2, 17:20-50.
116 In fact, Moore offers a grocery store as an example of a common schema. Moore,
supra, note 10, at 279.
117 See John Sharifi, Approaching the Bench: Trial Techniques for Defense Counsel in
Criminal Bench Trials, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 687, 691 (2005) ("[T]hey have enough
experience to know what evidence they are looking for when it comes to a particular crimi-
nal charge.").
118 Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 2, 3:35-4:10. The judge preceded that admon-
ishment of the prosecutor by chiding defense counsel for not objecting on hearsay grounds.
Id. at Disk 2, 3:17-19. The balance and substance of these examples demonstrate that this
degree of judicial intervention is not necessarily a manifestation of judicial favoritism to-
ward either party. Cf Doran, supra note 12, at 19 ("[P]sychological studies suggest that it
is very difficult for active investigators to suspend judgment and weigh evidence dispas-
sionately."). Even the brief description of the Safeway trial in supra Part I shows the judge
having difficulty suspending judgment, but the discussion of the trial throughout this Arti-
cle will reveal that his activism did not necessarily compromise his impartiality.
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The judge's suspicion proved correct. The witness said that she did
not know how the bottle had been broken. A similar exchange oc-
curred later in the case as the judge contemplated the expected medi-
cal testimony:
Judge: Is your doctor going to be able to say, "I can testify that he
was hit in the head with a bottle?"
Prosecutor: No, your Honor.
Judge: He can testify he has a lump on his head.
Prosecutor: Yes, your Honor.
Judge: And he can testify he had a concussion, a mild concussion.
Prosecutor: Yes. 119
This exchange reads like a cross-examination, with the judge asking
leading questions and the attorney falling into the role of a submis-
sive, well-controlled witness, assenting to follow the path the examiner
has charted. 120 Together, these examples illustrate how a judge's mind
may race ahead of the evidence and how critical it is that lawyers an-
ticipate and move quickly to distinguish their case from the category
of seemingly similar cases to which the judge has assigned it. Rapid
response is especially important where, as here, the judge's early fac-
tual suppositions are confirmed.
To his credit, the judge did not stop at pattern recognition and
instead continued to actively explore the facts and their possible
meaning. This element of the trial is best captured in his considera-
tion of the state's request for a material witness warrant1 21 to compel
the presence of the youth who allegedly stole the bottle from the
store. The proffer offered by the youth's lawyer in support of excus-
ing him from appearing was extremely slight,' 2 2 but the judge denied
the state's request anyway. The judge arrived at this ruling after
presenting aloud sections from two pseudo-closing arguments, one of
which is excerpted here, that addressed the witness's hypothetical tes-
timony as opposing lawyers might have if he had testified.
So, theoretically, [the other youth] said, 'Yeah, I hit him with a bot-
tle.' Security Officer says, 'No he didn't.' Matter of fact, the secur-
119 Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 4, 9:30.
120 Because the Safeway trial involved an extremely active judge and two inexperienced
lawyers (one of whom, defense counsel, was terribly ineffectual, if not constitutionally inef-
fective), the record in this case offers unusual access to what is ordinarily a largely interior
monologue.
121 WASH. CR. R. 4.10 (2009) authorizes a court to issue a warrant for the arrest of an
individual whose testimony would be material but who has refused to comply with (or is
not reasonably accessible by) a lawfully issued subpoena.
122 Having pled guilty and been sentenced, the youth had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. Counsel proffered that his memory of the incident was severely limited and that
testifying would negatively impact his substance abuse treatment. Safeway Theft, supra
note 37, at Disk 2, 25:50-26:09, 26:53-27:05.
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ity officer doesn't know if anybody hit him with a bottle. And the
evidence of the bottle is a broken bottle and the fact that he was
knocked unconscious, maybe, for a very short period of time....
Wouldn't you think the security officer would know pretty well
whether the guy he had on the ground hit him with a bottle or not?
... He would know, which meant, if he would know, then likely [the
other youth] didn't hit him with a bottle. [The other youth] may
have thought he hit him with a bottle. The officers may have told
[the other youth] he hit [the security guard] with a bottle, and [the
other youth] may have said, he may have bought off on that. An
Assault 2 rather than a Rob[bery] 2.123
This "defense closing" (because it calls into question the severity of
the assault and does not implicate the respondent) not only modeled
good advocacy for the novice lawyers, 124 it laid bare the judge's view
of the trial process and the justice system. The explanation that the
young man said what he needed to (truthful or not) in order to take
advantage of a desirable plea offer sets this judge apart from many of
his colleagues. Despite (or perhaps because of) their daily involve-
ment in the guilty plea process, few judges are willing to be so candid,
especially in the crucible of a trial in which that candor carries
consequences.
The judge took an equally exploratory approach to the legal is-
sues in the case. Having concluded that the facts had not developed in
line with the precedent he had cited in the early-trial chambers confer-
ence, he told counsel he would like to "throw two other things...
legal issues, that you might want to take a look at."' 125 The judge then
spun two very elaborate and legally intricate variations on the theme
of accomplice liability, so elaborate that he stumped himself.126 Try-
123 Id. at Disk 4, 3:30.
124 See PAUL BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY 27-30 (2d ed. 1989) (describing how lawyers
can use generalizations to frame arguments and then develop the argument further by
showing that the case in question is either an especially strong case for accepting the con-
tested generalization or a case requiring an exception to it). Applied to the Safeway case,
this approach works as follows:
Generalization: A person would know if another person hit him with a bottle "espe-
cially when" he is a security guard who had the suspect under control.
Generalization: People do not admit to crimes they did not commit "except when"
doing so offers some identified benefit and law enforcement officers have told them
they did commit the offense.
125 Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 3, 23:50.
126 Id. at Disk 3, 24:20-25:27:
Judge: [I]f his conduct was an effort to allow the person who had taken the wine to
retain the property, then, is that an accomplice to the robbery? Because robbery is
taking and retaining the property. So if someone has taken it and after the fact, you
assist him in retaining it, is that part of the robbery? But he's not charged with
robbery. Uhm. Then the question is if he were in fact by that act an accomplice to
the robbery, if he was not the one who struck a blow with the bottle, and that was
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ing to clarify, he included a wildly inapposite reference to the felony
murder doctrine and then dismissed counsel to complete their "home-
work. 1 27 The logic puzzle the judge had assigned, full of confusing
temporal and logical leaps, bore little relation to the straightforward
theory the state had presented-i.e., the respondent struck the victim.
The judge's fascination with complicated notions of accomplice liabil-
ity and "relating back" suggest a legal mind hungry for challenges and
seemingly starved by routine juvenile court practice.
Returning to these questions the next day, the judge revealed that
his thinking was clouded, even haunted, by a case he had been in-
volved in years earlier. Just before presenting his closing argument,
counsel for the state informed the judge that a student intern who was
present in the courtroom had completed some of the research the
judge had assigned. Even though the judge now realized that he had
led counsel down a "bad path," he invited the student to address the
court.1 2 8 The student mis-stated the law, positing that an accomplice
could be found liable for the principal's actions even if he did not
know which crime the principal intended to commit. Ruefully, the
judge reflected:
That's what I said when I got reversed in that case, the 'a' versus
'the' case. I, they came in and wanted a clarification for the jury
and I told the jury they don't have to know the specific crime but
they have to know the general nature of the crime. That's what I
said .... Igot reversed. They said he should have said 'the' instead
of 'a'. And that my clarification only made it worse. Now, if they
went to my clarification later, they changed it. They said my clarifi-
cation not only didn't help, it made it worse. And I got reversed. 129
As he revisits this moment from his past, the supremely confident star
of this one-man legal show yields the stage to a chastened lower court
judge who bears the marks of not only being found to have erred (the
two references to being reversed) but having "made it worse" (also
indeed someone else who was in the robbery, would him being an accomplice to the
robbery relate back .... [I]f it happened as a result of him helping someone retain
the property, would it then relate back to assaults that occurred in the course of the
robbery that occurred prior to him attempting to help him retain the prop-
erty?... Does that make sense?
Defense counsel: Well, uh, I'm just a little foggy on that. Can you ....
Judge: Me too. I understand it. It's hard to (set it out clearly).
127 Id. at Disk 3, 29:22.
128 Because the student was not licensed for student practice (or even eligible to be so
licensed), this was improper, but, as is evident from the discussion thus far, this judge was
neither wedded to protocol nor inclined to pass up a chance to entertain an audience.
129 Id. at Disk 3, 38:00. The case in question is State v. Cronin, 14 P.3d 752, 758 (Wash.
2000) ("In our judgment, in order for one to be deemed an accomplice, that individual
must have acted with knowledge that he or she was promoting or facilitating the crime for
which that individual was eventually charged.") (emphasis in original).
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stated twice). The personal nature of the experience is evident from
his reference to "my clarification" (also stated twice). This judge has
not been reversed often, but the impact of this one instance remains
evident eight years later. 130
This episode of mid-trial reflection reveals how personality and
lived experience influence trials even when a professional, rather than
an ad hoc group of lay citizens, is making the critical decisions. In this
respect, this example, though built around the particular history and
character of this one judge, is broadly instructive. It shows a judge
relating to both the facts and law of a case in a manner fairly close to
what jury-derived narrative theory predicts. The story unfolds on
multiple levels, and the trial's narrative ranges far beyond - in terms
of both time and place - the incident in question. The trial partici-
pants and their activity assume an importance equal to or even greater
than that of those involved in the underlying events.
B. Resistance Is Mutual
The judge in the domestic assault case was almost the polar oppo-
site of the Safeway judge, in terms of the frequency (and apparent
relish) with which he intervened in the trial. This produced a more
subdued or even strained tone, but it did not diminish the volume of
information available to counsel as the case progressed, nor did it nec-
essarily indicate rigidity or conclusive pre-judgment. Early on, the
judge sent an inadvertent, yet unmistakable signal that he was not re-
ceptive to the theory of self-defense. Early in the mother's direct ex-
amination, she testified that her son had called for help. The defense
objected on hearsay grounds. The judge overruled the objection, stat-
ing, "It's not hearsay. This is offered to say why she responded in this
situation. ' 131 As a matter of law, this ruling is unremarkable. The
son's statements are offered for their effect on the hearer (i.e., the
mother), not for the truth. Because the defense had depicted the
mother as the principal aggressor in its opening statement, her motiva-
tion for entering the room was highly relevant. As a window onto the
judge's view of the case, this ruling is a boon 132 for the lawyers. One
130 A Westlaw search turned up no other cases. The force of the experience bears out
the suggestion of Guggenheim and Hertz that finding ways to "embed a factual narrative in
a legal framework . . . has the additional benefit of a highly useful subtext about the risk of
appellate reversal if the judge convicts on evidence the appellate court is likely to regard as
insufficient." Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 589-90.
131 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 1, 17:35-44.
132 In the previously cited interview with the author, supra note 93, attorney Brad Keller
referred to a judge's pretrial involvement with civil litigation as a "gift" for lawyers because
it may enable them to discern valuable information about the judge's understanding. Be-
cause the discovery process in criminal and juvenile cases is less formal and less extensive,
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would not naturally describe a mother as having "responded in this
situation." One might say that a mother "came into the room" or
"went to see what was wrong." Police, not parents, "respond" to situ-
ations. The judge is apparently operating, nearly automatically, ac-
cording to a script for a Standard Trial in which a police officer
describes what led him/her to take certain actions to investigate a
case. Writing the mother into this script, the judge accords her a privi-
leged place. Repeated interaction with police officers conditions
judges to view them with enhanced credibility 133 and to presume their
use of physical force to be justified. Although this example comes
from a small moment in the trial, it is hardly trivial. Only minutes
after defense counsel had attempted to paint the mother as a wantonly
aggressive rogue actor, the judge effectively, if only preliminarily, dis-
missed this argument.
Like the Safeway judge acknowledging that the case law he
thought would control had turned out to be inapposite, the judge in
the assault case would soon find that the mother was not up to the
elevated role in which he had cast her. Fortunately for the state, its
case did not depend upon her credibility, as her son was a far more
persuasive witness. Consistent with the motif of subtle, even uncon-
scious, revelation established with regard to the initial hearsay objec-
tion, the judge marked the shift in focus from the mother to the son in
a pair of linked evidentiary rulings that offer a vivid example of the
lawyering challenge of managing such within-trial messages. The
prosecutor attempted, over defense objection, to admit the recording
of each witness's conversation with the 911 dispatcher. The judge ad-
mitted the mother's portion of the call and excluded the son's. Given
the mother's emotional state during the call, her portion easily quali-
fied as an excited utterance. 134 The evidence of the son's emotional
state was less clear, and the prosecutor argued, unsuccessfully, for ad-
mission of his recording as a present sense impression.135 These split
rulings136 generated a highly significant paradox that becomes clear
when the witnesses' testimony is compared as is done below. The rul-
ing admitting the mother's portion of the recording contained a
there are fewer meaningful pretrial engagements, making mid-trial moments, such as the
one described in this Article, supremely important.
133 See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 574.
134 WASH. R. EvID. 803(a)(2) (2008).
135 Id. 803(a)(1). Because both declarants were available for cross-examination, admis-
sion of either recording would not violate the respondent's confrontation right under the
Sixth Amendment, as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
136 The judge's awareness of the distinction he was making was evident from his com-
ment excluding the son's portion: "The part of the 911 tape that mother was on is in, but
not this part." Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 2, 7:51.
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favorable signal for the defense, while the ruling excluding the son's
portion sent a countervailing and nearly dispositive sign of good news
for the state.
The content of the two witnesses' testimony overlapped consider-
ably, but mother and son presented nearly incompatible personas and
narratives. As the victim and the only adult present during the inci-
dent, the mother ought to have established both the emotional force
and the logical authority of the state's case. 137 She failed terribly at
the latter and may have offered too much of the former. Always in-
gratiating in manner, she told a story that was often overheated, at
times implausible, and riddled with contradictions, both with her own
prior statements and her son's later testimony. Even before her direct
examination was over, the judge had ample reason to doubt her relia-
bility. 138 The mother's candid admission that she "responded," to use
the judge's loaded term, to her daughter's kicking by picking up a
clothes hanger and "poking" at the girl while she was trapped beneath
the door must have fuelled the judge's doubts about her judgment.
The fact that she retreated to the bathroom even before she realized
she had been injured, leaving her son to deal with his still-agitated
sister, further eroded the authority she ought to have wielded as the
only adult in the home.
In almost every way that the mother was flawed as a witness, the
son was strong. He provided one crucial narrative element which the
mother could not, namely a precipitating event to the entire episode:
his entry into his sister's room to pick up the phone. This is a trivial
incitement, for sure, but no less believable for that. It is critical be-
cause it does what neither lawyer had done: normalize the incident.
Many families have seen disturbances set off by such tiny, seemingly
harmless, sparks. The unhistrionic tone and logical and complete sub-
stance of his testimony aligned with the persona established within the
very brief introduction to his examination. A seventeen-year-old high
school student, a lifeguard, and an older brother, he was the only per-
son the mother could turn to for help. Ultimately, he assumed near-
parental status, first coming to the sister's aid, then the mother's, and
137 See BURNS, supra note 8.
138 To take just one example, the mother testified that after slashing at her with a clothes
hanger, her daughter "basically took the door and started swinging the door at us and hit
us, well she hit me with the door, on my arm as well." Domestic Disturbance, supra note
40, at Disk 1, 29:45. Even before the son contradicted this testimony, describing how
Michelle held (not swung) the door and bumped into him (not his mother), the judge could
see that the respondent was small in stature and unlikely to be swinging a large closet door
around like King Kong wielding the top section of a skyscraper. Early in the cross exami-
nation, the mother admitted that the door was "not a hollow-core. It's not light. It's not
something that I'd like to go pick up." Id. at Disk 1, 48:00.
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eventually serving as the intermediary with the police. This pattern
continued at trial as he held the state's case together.
After the prosecution proffered the son's recording as a present
sense impression, the defense clarified its original objection by saying
that he had already testified as to what he saw and "there's no need
for any further testimony about that. ' 139 To the extent that the objec-
tion was based on cumulativeness, the judge should have denied it.
The hearsay exception for present sense impression testimony is pre-
mised on the notion that statements made contemporaneously with an
observation about the matter being observed are reliable enough to
not require an oath or cross-examination. 140 Thus, the recording is in
some important sense better evidence than and certainly not cumula-
tive of the testimony. Nevertheless, the judge excluded the son's por-
tion of the recording, making a point of stating that the record should
reflect that he had not "even listened to the second part so [couldn't]
be prejudiced by it.' ' 141 Thus adverting indirectly to an appeal which
could come only if the judge found the respondent guilty, the judge
offered an unintended ironic endorsement of counsel's argument that
there was "no need" for further evidence regarding the son's percep-
tions. The mother's testimony, plagued with holes and hyperbole, re-
quired supplementation with the recording. The son's superior
testimony did not. In fact, it would eventually serve as the main basis
for the court's finding of guilt. The legal issues prompted by the 911
calls would have been identical in a jury trial, and there would be no
reason for the judge to have ruled differently with a jury in the box.
The absence of a jury, however, gave defense counsel warning of the
need to shift narrative strategy to focus on the son before his testi-
mony was complete. 142
Defense counsel did not have the benefit of the comparison be-
tween the evidentiary rulings while the mother was on the stand (as
the son had yet to testify). Nevertheless, the mother's time on the
stand provided ample indications of the futility of a narrative built
upon her inadequacy as a witness. The recording of the mother's con-
versation with the 911 dispatcher was gripping in a way that her testi-
mony never was. The call ended with a ten-second interlude of
sobbing and wailing that seemed to require the several seconds of si-
lence in the courtroom that followed its airing. The recording did not
139 Id. at Disk 2, 7:31.
140 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 453 (2008) ("The guaran-
tee of trustworthiness is contemporaneity .... ").
141 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 2, 7:58.
142 Of course, these developments ought to have likewise signaled to the prosecutor that
she should frame her case around the son's testimony rather than that of the mother.
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bolster her credibility; it vaulted her past the question of credibility.
In important respects, once the recording was played, the mother
ceased to be a witness, i.e., an actor in trial whose reliability could be
tested or challenged. Instead, she assumed the primary identity of vic-
tim or survivor-i.e., an embodiment of the harm the respondent had
allegedly caused. She had a symbolic, rather than pragmatic, role.
The mother appeared quite content in this spectral role. Con-
fronted early in her cross-examination with a purportedly inconsistent
statement, she mused aloud, in apparent earnest, "I wonder what
David would say, if David remembers which it was."' 143 With this, the
mother disavowed the authority both the state and the judge had in-
vested in her at the trial's outset. As the parent and the only adult
present during the incident, she ought to have been the one who could
be counted on to eliminate doubt. Instead, she raised doubt and left it
for her son to clear up. Just as she had handed off the phone to him
during the incident, she essentially abdicated her seat on the witness
stand, agreeing to defer to whatever her son might say.
Despite the fact that her target had been doubly removed, once
by the recording and once by the witness's own surrender, defense
counsel carried through with the plan of attack signaled in her open-
ing. With technically sound impeachments, counsel achieved some
measure of success. The witness admitted inconsistencies between her
testimony and prior statements she had made. However, the mechan-
ics of the impeachment undermined its impact, and more important,
the attack re-enacted the state's core narrative and alienated the
judge. Counsel properly began the impeachment by drawing atten-
tion to the testimony to be impeached: 144
Counsel: When you got there you saw David trying to grab onto the
door to avoid it falling on Michelle, is that your testimony?
Witness: Yes. 145
Counsel then led the witness to admit to having made an inconsistent
statement during a pretrial interview with counsel. Counsel did this so
deftly that the witness not only admitted the prior statement, she her-
self pointed out the inconsistency: "According to this one, I said the
door's already on her and then I said it wasn't on her." The judge
interrupted at this point, "Which is it? That's what she's asking. "146
On paper, the judge's question appears to be a neutral reframing of
counsel's question. On the recording, however, his tone communi-
cates withdrawal. The emphasis is on "she's" rather than "that's."
143 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 1, 54:20.
144 See LUBET, supra note 54, at 126.
145 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 1, 48:20.
146 Id. at Disk 1, 53:52.
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Counsel may believe the answer is crucial, but the judge appears not
to. This is not an unusual result. A highly experienced and accom-
plished public defender has shared with the author that practice in
juvenile court bench trials taught her long ago that judges typically do
not see in impeachments the destructive power attorneys intend.147
A later example from the domestic assault trial suggests this dis-
connect is not always due to judicial resistance to persuasion. Again
displaying textbook form, defense counsel asked the mother if her
memory of the incident was better, fresher, at the time of the pretrial
interview than now at trial. Earlier equals better, who could dispute
that? The witness didn't. The facts here, however, did not compel, or
even much support, this inference. The two statements being com-
pared (direct testimony and pretrial interview) were much closer in
time to each other than either was to the event in question. There is
no reason to think that the witness's memory suffered any serious de-
terioration in the two weeks between the interview and the trial. 148 It
is entirely reasonable for the judge to believe that the trial process
over which he presides is more conducive to eliciting the truth than
the informal, lawyer-driven interview process.
The most potent disconnect between lawyering technique and
narrative sensitivity occurred a little later when defense counsel
presented the mother with a transcript of the interview and directed
her to the pertinent page and lines:
Counsel: ... [R]ead a couple of lines down.
(10 seconds of silence)
Counsel: Let me know when you're done.
(16 more seconds of silence)
Counsel: I'm just asking you to read line 19 to about line 22.
(10 more seconds of silence)
Witness: Uh-hum. 14 9
The witness eventually went where counsel led her, saying, "If I said it
was on her in that one, at that time, that was, my memory was
fresher... The door might have been already on her.... I'm sorry, I'm
147 Email from Floris Mikkelsen, Director, The Defender Association, to the author
(August 29, 2009, 11:51 p.m. PST) (on file with author); see also Guggenheim, supra note 8,
at 574 ("In cases in which an officer's testimony is contradicted by previous statements or
other officers' testimony, the judge is likely to presume that the inconsistency stems from a
mistake or misunderstanding, rather than from fabrication.").
148 Juvenile court procedure doubly reduces the potential effectiveness of impeachments
such as the one discussed here. The timeframe for trial is compressed compared to most
criminal cases (generally a positive feature in that it enables the service component of the
juvenile court to engage the youth closer in time to his offending), and counsel generally
lacks the power that civil litigators wield to force witnesses to make their pre-trial state-
ments under oath.
149 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 1, 51:30.
[Vol. 16:195
Sharing Stories: Narrative Lawyering in Bench Trials
trying to remember.1 150 However, the empty silences here were no
match for the pregnant silence which followed the state's airing of the
911 call.
By the time counsel moved on to another similar impeachment,
the judge seemed to have run out of patience. When counsel asked a
question about whether the mother had said that the door was cover-
ing the girl below her knees, the judge interrupted to ask, "Counsel,
I'm wondering what difference is it going [to make]?" 151 Defense
counsel had not only fought her way into a corner, losing the judge in
the process, she had unwittingly reinforced the state's framing of the
case around the aggressiveness of an unreachable and unfathomable
adolescent. The cross-examination of the mother was a conventional
effort in credibility destruction. It was technically sound and, at
points, convincing. It did not, however, account for the way the case
(and the mother's role within it) had developed. Destroying her cred-
ibility was no longer necessary, sufficient, or even helpful, and, in
working so hard to achieve this destruction, counsel cemented herself
and the judge in adversarial postures that were disadvantageous for
her client. With each attack, counsel led the judge to entrench himself
more strongly in the position of protecting the mother, the position
which the state had invited the judge to adopt in its opening, with its
rhetorical emphasis on the domestic violence aspect of this case. An
identical examination might well have induced similar reactions on the
part of jurors. Because this was a bench trial, counsel had the oppor-
tunity to see this resistance developing and make needed adjustments.
C. Plain and Simple
The friction that emerged from defense counsel's impeachment of
the mother in the domestic assault case should not be over-interpreted
to mean that bench trials are no place for aggressive cross-examina-
tion. The Sonics trial offers an example of a devastating examination.
As will be seen, the trial also shows a judge who marshals her words
(and her interruptions) carefully, but delivers them pointedly when
she chooses to speak.
Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels was the City's first witness. Keller's
cross-examination concluded with a devastating sequence linking the
City to the "forced bleeding" strategy1 52
Keller: And in July of that summer, did Mr. Walker meet with mem-
150 Id. at Disk 1, 54:15.
151 The last words are inaudible, but the meaning is clear. Id. at Disk 1, 59:05.
152 This examination began with an equally effective, albeit less aggressive, sequence
demonstrating the futility of the lease for both the city and the team under current finan-
cial conditions. See infra note 173.
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bers of your administration to talk about making it too expensive
and litigious for Mr. Bennett?
Mayor Nickels: It appears, it appears that Mr. Walker did meet with
members of my administration sometime around July 24th....
Keller: Do you see the reference in the email about a message fight-
ing PBC's attempt to leave?
Mayor Nickels: Yes....
Keller: [The email] says . . . make it too expensive and too litigious
for him. I get the impression they, "they" there refers to the City
administration personnel, right?
Mayor Nickels: I believe so.
Keller: And it certainly has become litigious, hasn't it?
Mayor Nickels: It has.
Keller: Certainly has become expensive, right?
Mayor Nickels: Yes. 153
This examination was apparently still ringing in the ears of the City's
lawyers two weeks later. Seeking to repair the damage, they sought to
call Deputy Mayor Tim Ceis in rebuttal to distance City officials from
the damning PowerPoint presentation.154 The owners' lawyers ob-
jected, claiming that their ability to explore these issues in discovery
had been limited by the City's invocation of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 155 Attorney Paul Lawrence argued that the information about
the PowerPoint was not within the privilege claim (and thus could
have been explored in discovery) because any involvement Slade Gor-
ton might have had with the PowerPoint was in the course of his sepa-
rate work on behalf of the prospective local ownership group and not
within his capacity as counsel for the City.156 This set up the following
exchange:
Judge: You are saying that Mr. Gorton's activities and Mr. Walker's
activities with the Ballmer group were inside the scope of the en-
gagement letter?
Lawrence: No. They were inside the scope of the carve-out that was
provided to the city.
Judge: And so that was all carved out and you didn't have any obli-
gation to tell your client what you were doing?' 57
Even on the cold page of the transcript, the judge's tone of disap-
proval when she said "so that was all carved out" is unmistakable.
With this ruling, she also delivered an important message about the
153 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 99-102.
154 Id. at 45:22-46:2.
155 Id. at 50:4-18.
156 Id. at 57:23-58:1.
157 Id. at 59:1-8.
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threat she perceived the carve-out to pose to core values of the legal
profession. Stating that the Sonics ought to have had the chance to
depose Gorton with respect to "his dual representation and the confi-
dences that he may have been passing from one group to the
other, ' 158 she condemned a distinguished fellow lawyer in terms no
member of the bar could miss. "Dual representation," is often prob-
lematic, and passing confidences absolutely dishonorable. 59 Heading
into closing, counsel was on notice that the judge saw something quite
"wrongful," to use a term from the City's opening, buried within its
case.
The examination of witnesses has an obvious narrative compo-
nent in that it is the primary means of presenting the finder-of-fact
with the materials from which the conclusive story of the trial shall be
constructed. As described in this section, bench trials frequently pro-
duce engagements between counsel and the judge that themselves be-
come crucial moments in the trial narrative. Like defense counsel in
the domestic assault case, the City's lawyers found themselves athwart
the judge. It would thus be essential that they attempt in closing to
address this conflict in a way that aligned with their ultimate advocacy
goals. Failing to do so would muffle their closings, however logically
sound or solidly rooted in evidence they might be.
IV. THE LAST DANCE: CLOSING ARGUMENT AS A
NARRATIVE CLIMAX
The finality of closing argument challenges lawyers to stretch
their performance skills to their limits, and the most successful advo-
cates command the floor by means of a full repertoire of moves. In
the trial that has served as the focus of Philip Meyer's trilogy of narra-
tive articles, defense attorney Jeremiah Donovan "sometimes strode
and other times tip-toed in front of the jurors. He shouted, then whis-
pered, and waved wildly with his arms. [The judge] hid his face to
cover a smile, and the audience guffawed out loud. ' 160 Meyer
158 Id. at 66:4.
159 In the course of her exploration of the record with counsel, the judge had observed
the unremarkable principle that "we value the confidences of the lawyers with their client
to keep those secret." Id. at 64:15-16. The record does not show that Gorton ever improp-
erly disclosed any client confidences, but the blurred lines created what the judge deemed
to be a genuine risk of this.
160 Meyer, Desperate III, supra note 24, at 733 (quoting Edmund Mahony, Defendant
Takes Hits From Both Sides, HARTFORD COURANT, July 17, 1991, at D1). For a report on a
similar performance, even more outsized, reflected in part by the fact that it took place
during opening statement, see Henry Blodget's description of Robert Morvillo's opening
statement in defense of Martha Stewart. Henry Blodget, Opening Statements, SLATE,
Jan. 28, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2094441/entry/2094561/ ("At times, Bob Morvillo's
voice completely filled the cavernous courtroom .... At times, he nearly whispered. At
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presents this argument as a demonstration of a "surreal, post-modern-
ist electronic dance" 161 between popular and legal storytelling. The
terminology here may overstate the novelty of such forms of advo-
cacy, 162 but Meyer is certainly right to see the complexity with which
the best closing arguments are constructed, even in their most seem-
ingly off-hand or casual moments. 163 The care with which lawyers
build these concluding moments leaves them extremely reluctant to
cede even the slightest bit of control over the production. The extent
of this desire for control can be glimpsed from a failed attempt at
procedual innovation which I observed serveral years ago. A trial
judge proposed allowing jurors to ask the lawyers questions before
closing arguments. It was by then routine for judges to allow jurors to
submit potential questions for witnesses, but the idea of having the
jurors submit questions to the lawyers was far more radical. In the
judge's eyes, this innovation, which he made optional, would benefit
all involved. The jurors would have their primary concerns addressed.
The lawyers would learn what the people they needed to persuade
were thinking. These potential advantages notwithstanding, lawyers
were unwilling to surrender even a modicum of creative control over
their performance. I never saw nor heard of any lawyers electing to
be questioned, and those I spoke to about the idea expressed some-
thing close to horror. Asking jurors what was on their minds would
grant undue weight to thoughts they had formed without the benefit
of the lawyers' arguments. The only way to measure the worth of the
juror's questions, it seems, was by whether the lawyers deemed them
significant enough to address in closing without having heard them.
Bench trial lawyers may likewise aspire to keep the judge in rapt
times, he prowled the aisles like a grizzly bear, swiping paws, roaring in indignation; at
times, he learned on the edge of the jury box, as cuddly and unthreatening as a koala.").
161 See Meyer, Desperate II, supra note 24, at 933. This assessment is founded upon the
lawyer's use of jump-cut chronology, highly visual imagery, and visual aids.
162 Like Jeremiah Donovan, Robert Morvillo is a self-proclaimed "no-nonsense" trial
lawyer, who would almost certainly reject the post-modernist label. See Colgate University
News & Events, http://blogs.colgate.edu/2007/12/robert-morvillo-60-speaks-at-i-html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2009); see also Miller, supra note 109, at 552 (observing that when lawyers
engage in thoughtful narrative lawyering, "the story we tell is not so different from the
kinds of stories that good lawyers have been telling for years").
163 Jeremiah Donovan has analogized his use of fractured chronology to the flirtatious
prolonging of a date's potential romantic interest. Jeremiah Donovan, Some Off-The-Cuff
Remarks About Lawyers As Storytellers, 18 VT. L. REV. 751, 756-57 (1994) ("When I talk
to juries in my closing argument I think back to my bachelor days, and the jury is my date.
We just saw a movie and we're drinking coffee and talking about the movie. I talk about
the trial as if it were the film we saw.... I talk directly to a particular juror... 'Remember
the part where Sonny Castagno said that he was going to give Jackie Johns a call that
night? Do you know why that was so important?' . . . and then I'll talk about something
else.... Now the jurors are dying to know why I think what Castagno said was so impor-
tant. At the end, when I finally come back to it, they will be all ears.").
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silence, but they cannot prevent audience participation. In fact bench
trials reverse the dynamic, leaving the lawyers at risk of being unable
to address their main concerns. Unlike the jurors, the lawyers cannot
be silenced, only disregarded. The lawyers' narrative options and
strategies in closing can be evaluated in terms of how they accommo-
dated the judges' personalities, history, and conception of their role as
the judges revealed them during the trial. The Safeway and Sonics
trials illustrate the extent to which the process of collective creation
which marks bench trials can be intensified in closing. In stark con-
trast, the judge in the domestic assault case remained aloof, seemingly
well beyond the reach of counsel's arguments. Reviewed as a group,
the trials call for an adaption to Meyer's metaphor: bench trial closing
is a highly traditional form of dance, one in which lawyers must coor-
dinate their movements with the judge, leading when they can and
following when they must. Dazzle has less value, and nimbleness is at
a premium. This section will look first at the Safeway trial, because
the judge's activity makes plain so much that is often hidden from
view. Next, the Sonics closings will be analyzed, again in some detail
because they are rich with narrative detail. Finally, the domestic as-
sault case will be considered as a particularly challenging lawyering
dilemma.
A. Judge as Seeker, Lawyers on the Sidelines
As he had throughout the trial, the Safeway judge asserted a
strong controlling hand over the closing arguments, beginning with
the framing question referenced earlier, "Based on the testimony, he's
guilty of something. What is it? That's what I want to hear your argu-
ment."'1 64 As it turned out, the judge did not show much interest in
counsel's argument. He afforded the prosecutor no more time to ad-
dress the pivotal issue he himself had raised-the degree of as-
sault165-than he had allotted the intern for the extraneous
accomplice liability issues. Citing common sense and policy, the pros-
ecutor argued that even a minor concussion constituted substantial
bodily harm, making this a second-degree assault, because the victim
was at grave risk, unable to protect himself from any further dan-
ger. 166 The court rejected this sensible analysis, explaining:
164 See Safeway Theft, supra note 37.
165 Because Washington has a determinate juvenile sentencing scheme, see WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.40.0357 (2008), this is a more important fight than it might be under other
states' juvenile justice codes, many of which have indeterminate schemes. Assault in the
Second Degree is a B+ offense for which the presumptive sentence range is 15-36 weeks.
The presumptive range for Third Degree Assault includes probation and no more than 30
days in detention. Id.
166 The following exchange from the prosecutor's closing confirms Sharifi's observation
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You knock somebody out, you put somebody in a coma for a week
which is temporary or a few hours which is temporary, I would cer-
tainly say that is substantial bodily harm. But to say that when
you're out playing football and you run into somebody and you're
dazed and two seconds later you wake up you've suffered substan-
tial bodily harm, I don't buy it. I don't think that is, particularly,
when you can probably get up and keep playing the game until you
get knocked out a few more times and the coach pulls you from the
game and says, "Enough's enough. ' 167
The prosecutor would have been justified in feeling blindsided by
the judge's football metaphor.168 It is hard to imagine a thoughtful
defense attorney offering this comparison to a jury. (Referring to a
week-long coma as "temporary" is technically accurate, of course, but
grossly insensitive.) The difference between an injury incurred within
the rules of a game freely entered and one that resulted from a theft
(i.e., an act wrong in itself) followed by a double-teaming sucker
punch to the back of the head is seemingly so plain as to rebut itself.
Given the chance to rebut, the prosecutor might suggest that the cow-
ardly nature of the punch makes it far more characteristic of disrepu-
table professional wrestling than of football.
However legally and rhetorically dubious, the football metaphor
expresses something essential about the judge's view of the trial as a
that "Closing argument in a bench trial can be similar to an appellate argument." Sharifi,
supra note 117, at 698:
Judge: Assault two has different ways of doing it.
Prosecutor: That's correct, Your Honor.
Judge: And your way here is ... ?
Prosecutor: My way is that he assaulted another and thereby recklessly inflicted sub-
stantial bodily harm ....
Judge: Substantial bodily harm. What's the definition?
Prosecutor: .... [B]odily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigure-
ment or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily part or organ ....
Judge: Your argument that anytime you hit somebody and knock them out, that's
substantial?
Prosecutor: Absolutely.
Judge: And you do it under substantial bodily harm meaning loss of brain power.
Prosecutor: Yes.
Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 4, 41:00.
167 Id. at Disk 4, 51:00.
168 There was an easily-missed foreshadowing of this ruling in the mini-closing excerpted
above, supra text accompanying note 123, where the judge said: "And the evidence of the
bottle is a broken bottle and the fact that he was knocked unconscious, maybe, for a very
short period of time." Id. at Disk 4, 3:33 (emphasis added). The duration of the concussion
had no relevance to the issue then under discussion, so the fact that it emerged in the
judge's thinking even then reflects its salience to him. As the prosecutor was focused on
arguing for the material witness warrant, there is almost no way that the prosecutor could
have registered this hint.
[Vol. 16:195
Sharing Stories: Narrative Lawyering in Bench Trials
quest. 169 The task of judgment is an intellectual one, with logical de-
mands and moral ramifications, but throughout the trial the judge re-
ferred to his task in terms evoking physical activity and movement.
When defense counsel raised a routine preliminary objection to the
use of the term "victim" by the state's witnesses, the judge replied,
"I'll deal with it. I can cut through that.' 70 In other words, trivial
semantic concerns won't impede his progress. When the judge ex-
cused the youth who had taken the bottle from testifying, he stated, "I
don't see a compelling need to bring [him] in. I don't see that it gets
me very far.' 171 Denying the routine defense motion to dismiss at the
close of the evidence, the judge acknowledged that there was suffi-
cient evidence for a hypothetical fact-finder to conclude that the vic-
tim had been struck with a bottle, but then added "I think I've
signaled that I probably won't get there. 1 72 With this, the judge sig-
naled the span he envisions between logic (i.e., what might have oc-
curred or how he could justifiably rule) and action (i.e., what really
happened or how he will actually decide).
Approaching his task as a journey, the judge excluded evidence if
he did not believe it would move him forward. He dispatched wit-
nesses quickly once he had assessed the contribution they could make
to his progress.' 73 With others, he was willing to expend extra effort
to screen the evidence before taking it on. On direct examination, the
prosecutor had led the Safeway manager to affirm that the second
youth (i.e., the one who had not entered the store) "was basically on
top of" the security guard during the scuffle in the parking lot. 74
Keenly attuned to what the witness meant to say, the judge inter-
rupted and conducted a mini-examination of his own during which the
witness acknowledged that he did not see that second youth get at all
169 See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 64-65 (describing how defense closing was
modeled on an archetypal "Quest of the Hero" narrative, culminating in acknowledgment
that lawyer was asking jurors to do "one of the hardest things that you have ever been
required to do in public").
170 Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 1, 13:15 (emphasis in original).
171 Id. at Disk 4, 30:14 (emphasis in original).
172 Id. at Disk 4, 31:52.
173 As the case shifted from the pretrial motion to the trial on the merits, the judge
summarized the officer's motion testimony and extracted what was relevant for the trial,
stating, "That's all I need from his prior information." Id. at Disk 1, 56:10. The judge took
a similar approach to the testimony of the ER doctor:
Judge: Can you say, based on your examination, what he was struck with in the
head?
Doctor: No.
Judge: Thank you. That's all I need.
Id. at Disk 4, 9:30.
174 Id. at Disk 2, 51:05.
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close to the victim. 175
With its repeated clashes and strenuous exertion, football is an
apt parallel for the judge's high level of activity throughout the
case. 176 His keen attention and frequent intervention throughout the
trial constitute a form of discipline, a means of staying fit. On a foot-
ball field, momentary lapses in discipline can be devastating. The
judge carries the memory of his years-old legal lapse close to the sur-
face, but his zealous protection of the record, as with the store em-
ployee described in the preceding paragraph, goes well beyond that
which would be necessary merely to avoid reversal. It appears to be
failure ("making it worse") that he seeks to avoid. Supremely confi-
dent in his own abilities to reach his destination, he does not want to
give the lawyers or witnesses a chance to weigh him down with un-
needed or flabby questions, answers, or arguments. Taking responsi-
bility for all phases of the trial and holding himself to high standards,
the judge assumed the role of a traditional male warrior-hero, the sort
of figure often invoked by football coaches who keep sending players
back into the game until "[e]nough's enough."
The judge's reliance, conscious or otherwise, on this construct re-
flects a process of narrative construction similar to that seen in jury
trials. In their analysis of closing arguments in a jury trial, Amsterdam
and Hertz present the defense attorney's closing as patterned upon a
call to the jury to undertake a prototypical heroic quest, citing to Jo-
seph Campbell and his observation that "popular tales represent he-
roic action as physical. '177 The Safeway judge's particular way of
conceiving and articulating his role is simultaneously timeless and
time-bound. As this Article goes to print, Washington youth sports
coaches are entering their first season under the state's Lystedt law
which requires that any athlete removed from a game with a concus-
sion may not return until examined and cleared to play by a licensed
health care provider.178 Thus, the judge's sense of the significance of a
concussion, undoubtedly rooted in his own personal history and cul-
tural background, was out of step with the law and likely also with the
mind-set of the much younger prosecutor.
175 Id. at Disk 2, 51:57.
176 See BURNS, supra note 8, at 181-82 ("The trial is a space in which the agonistic or
competitive phase of civilization still lives. It confers on the exertions of all the partici-
pants 'a certain ethical value in so far as it means a testing of the player's prowess: his
courage, tenacity, resources, and last but not least, his spiritual powers-his fairness."').
177 Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 65 n.23 (quoting JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH
A THOUSAND FACES 38 (1968); citing to numerous other examples of the heroic quest).
178 WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.485 (2009).
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B. Becoming A Target: A Lawyer in the Judge's Crosshairs
In its closing in the Sonics trial, the City eschewed both dazzle
and nimbleness, offering instead the steadiness that had characterized
its opening. This mirroring showed in the language and structure of
the closing, which resurrected the emphasis on "public policy. '179
Having told the judge in opening that the trial would be routine be-
cause "the lease says what it says," in closing, counsel largely ignored
the trial that had in fact taken place. Counsel's argument made no
adjustments for the success the opposition had achieved in establish-
ing its two principal points: the inadequacy of the lease and the ques-
tionable dealings behind the effort to force a sale. That so much of
the damage on these points had occurred during the cross-examina-
tion of Mayor Nickels, 180 the City's first and most high-profile witness,
only heightened the salience of the testimony and the necessity of
crafting a response that addressed this major trial event.
Having sat silently, per custom, during the opening, the judge
made clear early on that she would not do so during closing. She con-
fronted counsel with the owners' argument about the lease: "[D]oesn't
the lease also have a reciprocal agreement? ... Wasn't... part of what
was bargained for that the City had to maintain its property as a viable
venue?" 181 In response, Lawrence leaps all the way over the testi-
mony, seeking refuge in the text of the lease: "There was nothing in
the lease-you can look at the lease back and forth-that required the
City to keep the facility as a state-of-the-art building for the entire 15
years of the lease. . . -"182 The judge had not suggested the arena
needed to be state-of-the-art, only "viable." The judge undoubtedly
noted the evasion. A little later, counsel claimed that "The only per-
son who has suggested the lease should be rewritten.., was Mr. Ben-
nett's group." The judge again interrupted, pointing again to the trial
testimony: "[I]s that really quite true? I mean basically Mr. Schultz
179 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 72:6-11 ("The point is that if the City, in
entering into the Key Arena lease, was entitled to make public-policy decisions to obtain
certain benefits, and the City in deciding to enforce the lease also is making a public-policy
decision to obtain the benefits, tangible and intangible, that flow from having a sports
stadium here in Seattle.").
180 Mayor Nickels had affirmed Keller's assertions that "an NBA franchise in today's
world can't be viable in Key Arena under this lease arrangement" and "this lease didn't
play out the way the City believed it would be when this 15-year vow was taken." Id. at 73-
76. The cross of Mayor Nickels was similar to, but perhaps more impressive than, that
described by Edelman. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. The officer whose testi-
mony Edelman discusses was a colleague and thus natural ally of the defendants in that
case. Mayor Nickels was squarely opposed to the Oklahoma-based owners trying to move
the team out of his city.
181 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 75:13-18.
182 Id. at 76:12-15.
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was down at the legislature trying to get to a different spot. And isn't
that inherently saying to the City 'we want out' . . . ?-183 Lawrence
resisted the judge's invitation to join the effort to make sense of this
complex bilateral relationship and offered instead an over-simplified
and, to the judge, unrecognizable universe in which everything is
painted in black and white.184 Counsel's extreme formulations (e.g.,
"nothing in the lease," "the only person," "state-of-the-art") distanced
him from the judge, who was carefully picking her way though the
facts, looking for a solution that acknowledged merit and fault in both
parties. Lawrence's lawyerly parsing of words stirs up undesired ech-
oes of the carve-out discussion that immediately preceded the closing.
Counsel is rhetorically isolating himself, an exile quite similar to the
more literal one which the judge would soon propose for his firm due
to the conduct of his colleague Slade Gorton. 185
When Judge Pechman asked counsel if a ruling for the City would
result in an endless series of squabbles over management issues, he
assured her that "[t]hese are sophisticated people who can get along
once they understand what the rights and obligations are. '186 After a
back-and-forth exchange about the few generally unsuccessful meet-
ings between the parties, the judge commented, "That's not real so-
phisticated when they both go to their own corners and refuse to talk
with one another, is it?"187 Here we see the judge, a woman, looking
at the powerful men involved in this dispute (and the principals in this
case are indeed all men), as children, each ready to take his ball and
go home when the others refuse to play the game his way. As Law-
rence tried to talk his way out of this corner, he wound up taking the
fire the judge seemed to want to direct at these not-so-sophisticated
183 Id. at 80:10-13.
184 See Philip N. Meyer, Making the Narrative Move: Observations Based upon Reading
Gerry Spence's Closing Argument in The Estate of Karen Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Inc., 9
CLIN. L. REV. 229 (2002) (describing closing in which attorney Gerry Spence cast Ms.
Silkwood, the decedent for whom he spoke, the various Kerr-McGee employees, and even
himself as actors in a morality tale). Spence told the jurors: "I have never seen a company
who so misrepresented to the workers." Id. at 263.
185 The judge eventually asked if it would be possible to "ameliorate the harm here to
the Sonics" by ordering K&L Gates to sever its ties with the city. Basketball Transcript,
supra note 77, at 115. Lawrence's struggles in this regard are quite similar to those that
defense counsel experienced in the domestic assault case as she persisted in attacking the
mother. See supra text accompanying note 151. They also call to mind Meyer's comments
on the lawyers in the Amsterdam & Hertz article: "They are making language choices,
employing metaphors, storytelling devices and techniques that are not always to their own
advantage. Most important, they seem somehow unaware of the strategic storytelling
choices that they are making at crucial junctures in their argument." Meyer, supra note
184, at 242.
186 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 1106:9-11.
187 Id. at 90:9-11.
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power brokers:
Judge: Mr. Lawrence, answer my question.
Lawrence: I'm trying to.
Judge: Did the mayor ever call Mr. Bennett back and say let's sit
down, let's talk about this, and see what we can do?
Lawrence: The mayor-
Judge: I didn't hear it.
Lawrence: The mayor's position has been consistent that he's will-
ing to talk about-the only thing he's willing to talk about is some-
thing that would allow the Sonics to stay through the end of the
lease and hopefully something future going forward. Since that was
not a discussion that Mr. Bennett was willing to have, there was no
discussion.
Judge: So answer to my question is no?
Lawrence: Not-the mayor was not willing to sit down and discuss
an early exit, correct.
Judge: Let's move on.188
The judge's frustration mounted as this dialogue progressed and it be-
came clear the parties had never attempted what she would consider
meaningful negotiations. Her tone while pushing counsel to acknowl-
edge this fact is that of a lawyer cross-examining an evasive witness or,
much the same, a parent who has caught a teenage child in a half-
truth. Plainly, this is a situation lawyers need not fear in a jury trial.
This example epitomizes the point raised during the discussion of
opening statements about judges' ability to hone in on weakness in a
lawyer's presentation. 189
Apparently trying to draw (or push) the parties into productive
settlement discussions by letting them see clearly what the case looked
like to her, the judge continued to hammer away at the missed
chances to settle. She acerbically confronted Lawrence with yet an-
other knife-edged fact regarding the problematic conduct of his law
firm colleague Slade Gorton:
Mr. Gorton goes with Mr. Ceis to the NBA to lay out their arena
plan, Mr. Bennett is invited to that meeting, they sign a document
where they agree that they are not going to tell anyone anything,
because that might actually be the best moment for all the parties
involved to cut a deal or to talk about what they can do to come to a
solution. And Mr. Gorton, less than 24 hours later, sends an email
to the Ballmer group, where they are talking-and he lays out
name, rank and serial number, and they all talk about going out and
188 Id. at 90:15.
189 In the previously-cited post-trial interview, Keller Interview, supra note 93, Brad
Keller advised that, in light of the near-certainty that judges will find each side's gravest




The exceedingly fine line-drawing that Lawrence defended through-
out the trial, even if only out of necessity, may not have required ex-
planation in a firm that represents sophisticated entities in complex
deals and disputes across multiple forums. Ultimately, however, it did
not matter if Gorton's activities were permissible or not. This was not
a bar disciplinary hearing governed by the law of ethics. It was a trial
in which the behavior had tainted the entire case in the eyes of the
judge. Eventually, Lawrence attempted to distance his client from
Gorton, t 91 a move that he could not have taken lightly, but even then
he tried to build the case on cold logic. Saying "there is no evidence
that links Mr. Gorton's actions to the city," he pointed out to the
judge that the email that so troubled her "was not copied to the city,
which if it was something done at the city's request you might ex-
pect. ' 192 Unsurprisingly, the "no cc" defense fared no better during
the closing than the "carve-out" explanation had moments earlier.
It is hard to imagine a wholly satisfactory response to the judge's
concern. Lawrence's candid admissions ("I cannot explain Mr. Gor-
ton's action, ' 193 and again, moments later, "I wish I could explain
what Mr. Gorton's thinking was"' 194) merit some sympathy. This was
certainly not what he had in mind when he began the trial with the
now piercingly ironic line that the case was "about the city of Seattle's
policy decision to specifically enforce their lease with the Seattle Su-
personics. 1 95 In ways he certainly never hoped, the trial had been
reduced to a judgment on the City's decision to sue, but with little
regard for any underlying policy. The legalistic approach to the trial
(e.g., carve-outs, no viability clause, no cc on the email) rendered the
City's case especially vulnerable to this particular form of unraveling.
Lawrence may have intended his persistence in the claim that the City
and its allies had done "nothing wrongful" as a show of tenacity. To
the judge, it probably looked a lot more like rigidity or sterility, sig-
naled in the opening and infecting the entire case. The City failed to
adjust its trial position even as the judge pushed harder and harder to
find a solution to a problem for which she concluded that responsibil-
ity was dispersed, creativity necessary, and time running out.196
190 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 115:8-17.
191 In fact, Lawrence stated that his firm would cease representing the city if the judge
deemed it necessary. Id. at 116.
192 Id. at 115-16.
193 Id. at 115:18.
194 Id. at 116:6-7.
195 See supra text accompanying note 18.
196 Although criticized by some in the media, the settlement reached while the judge's
decision was pending was not unfavorable to the city. The owners agreed to pay $45 mil-
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C. Lawyer in Stride, Judge Alongside
Brad Keller began his closing for the owners by inviting the court
to see the trial as a dynamic process: "You sit here as a court of equity
to decide from the ground up whether or not the remedy of specific
performance is available under the facts of this case as we stand here
now in 2008 given all we learned. ' 197 The italicized phrases connote
building, growth, and discovery. They present the trial as a process
the judge should be proud to have been a part of, not simply a ratifica-
tion of something which was obvious at the outset. Directing atten-
tion away from the adoption of the lease terms (thirteen years ago)
and placing it back on the trial, Keller simultaneously emphasized the
lease's current economic inadequacy and stoked the judge's displea-
sure at the machinations of Gorton and others.
Keller's central closing theme-"Look, we need to be straightfor-
ward here" 19 8-is simple yet surprisingly comprehensive. The "need
to be straightforward" has been the undercurrent running through the
case all the way back to his initial concession regarding the home-
game provision of the lease. And, of course, the "need to be straight-
forward" requires the court to reject the City's convoluted "carve-
outs" and elaborate "forced bleeding" plots that have been revealed
throughout the trial. The call to be straightforward has a legal dimen-
sion as well, one that presents the City's request for specific perform-
ance as extreme:
Stop and think for a minute. Why is it that specific performance is
considered so extraordinary? It is because money compensation is
the currency of our judicial system. You don't get to elect remedies.
It is money compensation. That is our currency that we deal with
here in this courthouse. 199
Having pushed nostalgic sentiment aside, Keller asked the judge to
listen to the cold fiscal heart beating inside the body of the civil justice
system.200 If, as he claimed in opening, contracts such as this one cre-
lion initially and $30 million more in five years if the city had not obtained a new NBA
team. The owners had offered $26.5 million three months before the trial. In a press con-
ference held after the closing arguments, Deputy Mayor Tim Ceis expressed his high re-
gard for counsel's work during the trial: "I just want to express my appreciation for the
great work [of] Paul Lawrence over the course of this trial and also particularly, though,
today in his closing." Deputy Mayor Tim Ceis, Press Conference (June 26, 2008) (audio
link available at http://blog.seattletimes.nwsource.com/sonicstrial1/2008/06/26/press-
conferenceaudio.html). This validation from his client encompassed the testimony of
Sherman Alexie: "I thought it was particularly telling that the judge asked about the issue
of sentimentality." Id.; see supra text accompanying note 84.
197 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 120 (emphasis not in original).
198 Id. at 124.
199 Id. at 132:20-25.
200 This "money only" theme marks a significant distinction between a lot of civil litiga-
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ate marriages, each one comes with a default prenuptial agreement
written into it.
Keller's push on the monetary value of a case plays powerfully off
of the judge's repeated expressions of concern over the missed oppor-
tunities to settle. In fact, the judge responds to this claim of "money,
only money" with a test of sorts. Referring to evidence in the record
as to the owners' last settlement offer,20 1 she suggests that it is not her
place to tell the City what is best:
Judge: Is it up to me to tell the City leadership: "You're asking for a
bad bargain"? That is not my role, is it?
Keller: No .... I will tell your Honor, since you raised that offer,
that offer was put together designed based on exactly how much the
financial payments would be under the lease to the City, and what
the remaining construction debt obligation would be at the end of it.
Judge: That wasn't lost on me, Mr. Keller. 202
The two of them, lawyer and judge, are perfectly in step here. Keller
can return to his marriage metaphor, confident that the judge is fol-
lowing its logic. As the relationship (the marriage) between the City
and the team was nearing dissolution (divorce), it was not necessary
that there be ugly conflict. The breakdown, as Keller said in opening,
was not the fault of either party, and it was still possible for them to
reach an understanding based on "what does the other guy need, what
tion and criminal cases, such as the juvenile cases described in this Article. To the extent
that monetary damages are the principal measure of a particular dispute, the possible re-
sults run along a continuous range. One side (and its lawyer) can claim a spot along that
continuum where it would like to end up and then work to keep the judge as close to it as
possible. In such circumstances, the trial takes on the aspect of mediation by costlier and
riskier means.
201 In the research conducted by Guthrie et al., judges did far worse in ignoring their
knowledge of settlement offers than they did in ignoring unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence. Guthrie, Judges Ignore, supra note 9, at 1291-93.
202 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 127:13, 128:1. Contrast the exchange be-
tween Keller and the judge regarding the settlement amounts with that between Lawrence
and the judge regarding some case law:
Lawrence: A case that is on point with this is Triple-A Baseball Association v. North-
eastern Baseball, Inc., out of the First Circuit, 1987 case. There the question was
whether or not-
Judge: You don't need to tell me about that case. I told you about it.
Lawrence: I appreciate that. I wasn't sure if Your Honor wanted to reveal that was
the case that you were asking about.
Judge: It obviously is the case.
Id. at 96:3-12. In each instance, counsel is telling the judge something she already knows.
Lawrence comes off, in the judge's eyes, as clumsily playing to her intellectual ego. Keller,
on the other hand, ends up showing a common mode of analysis. This is not intended to
suggest any favoritism on the judge's part. Keller has staked out a position that resonates
with the judge's problem-solving approach. Lawrence is grasping for purchase, trying to
make the case into a simple legal technician's quiz. As demonstrated above, the judge kept
having to pull Lawrence into the world as she saw it, where things were more complicated
and motives more mixed than he was letting on.
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is fair. '203 However, the decision to take the case to trial has trans-
formed the calculus. The revelation of the forced bleeding strategy is
what a sports announcer might call "a game-changing event." The
parties cannot restore the conditions that made the more generous
offer possible. Keller's clients had, he claims, shown mercy and large-
heartedness to their partners, but, having chosen to fight, the City
leaders would be left now to get only what they deserve.204 This line
of argument keeps the judge focused on the present and the future. If
the conditions immediately prior to trial cannot be re-created, cer-
tainly, the days of the signing of the lease are of, at most, archival
interest.
The closing concludes with a maneuver that combines humor and
pathos and reveals again how well-attuned Keller was to the judge's
sense of the case. Of course, it involves Slade Gorton. Keller links
the City to Gorton's activities in toto, arguing that the City and the
prospective local ownership group "each in a coordinated manner, im-
plemented the precise pincer strategy .... Each one doing what the
other needed and publicly joining hands" 20 5 when it was advantageous
or necessary to do so. He keeps the spotlight on the true bad actors,
the lawyers, rather than the public officials with whom they worked.
Keller marries words and image, saying: "And there is K&L Gates
smack dab in the middle coordinating all of this, ' 20 6 while presenting
on the courtroom screen a slide showing an image of a human brain.
One hemisphere is green, the other blue. One side is marked "City's
Litigation lawyers," the other "Griffin Group's Lawyers." 20 7
Here is Slade Gorton, the right side of his brain is working for the
Griffin group's lawyers, the left side is working for the City's litiga-
tion lawyers. We are supposed to think the left side of the brain isn't
talking to the right, and vice versa.208
The implausibility of Gorton compartmentalizing his work on and
thinking about this case sinks the City's desperate claim that the two
groups themselves were not in fact communicating:
You are being asked to accept that the City's attorney wasn't telling
his client what he was cooking up when the two had the exact same
objective, to keep the team here, and forcing the sale would have
203 Id. at 128:4.
204 Id. at 128:4-7. ("[The final pre-trial settlement offer] is different than what the set-
ting will be if we have a contested proceeding later and we are talking about what are they
actually entitled to." The amount of the final settlement, see supra note 196, suggests that
this was more rhetoric than reality.
205 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 138:6-7.
206 Id. at 138:10-11.




accomplished that objective for both. That is contrary to logic. That
is contrary to common sense. 209
Logic and common sense, the stock-in-trade of the "straightforward."
The slide is quite simple, rudimentary even, and, of course, scientifi-
cally incorrect.210 Much conventional wisdom would deem such visual
aids unnecessary and even dangerous in a bench trial, dismissing them
as lawyer showmanship, if not showboating.211 It is impossible to pre-
cisely gauge the slide's impact on the judge's thinking, but it did make
her laugh.212 Keller ends the case by inviting the judge to step for-
ward as he steps aside: "Enough is enough. The marriage is broken.
Please stop the bleeding. '213 Keller's time on the dance floor is up.
He yields the floor and the spotlight to the judge. After a trial that
has been about failures of different kinds, the judge is in position to
perform an act of healing.
However amusing Judge Pechman found the slide and however
gratifying it might have been to heal the wounds between the parties,
it would be a mistake to interpret the pointedness and intensity of her
challenges to counsel during closing as a clear indication of a likely
ruling on the merits. Nevertheless, these interactions do contain les-
sons for bench trial lawyers. In the best of circumstances, bench trials
offer lawyers something they will never have in a jury trial: the chance
to participate in what is effectively an intermediate stage of delibera-
tions. Admission to this stage of decision-making, the near-equivalent
of a seat in the jury-room, comes at a price. Counsel must be ready to
set aside the self-regard that characterizes many closings. Even at this
late stage, it is not too late to refine a position. In fact, persuasion of a
truly skeptical judge may require such an adjustment. Like "interme-
diate," the term" refine" is carefully chosen. Closing is no time for a
full-scale tear-down of a case theory. Optimally, the case theory
presented in opening was chosen with the requisite flexibility to ac-
commodate the inevitable knocking around that trial can do to a law-
yer's plans. But where a choice must be made, and often, as here, the
judge will let counsel know, the closing must be true to the trial and
209 Id.
210 The graphic quality of the slide is strikingly similar to one Jeremiah Donovan used in
the trial Meyer has written about, at least as reproduced in Meyer's article. Meyer, Des-
perate I, supra note 24, at 748.
211 But see Sharifi, supra note 117, at 693.
212 Damon Agnos, Best Friend of the Enemy, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Aug. 6, 2008, at 68,
available at http://www.seattleweekly.com/bestof/2008/award/best-friend-of-the-enemy-
477178 ("The graphic elicited laughter from Judge Marsha Pechman and pithily summa-
rized Keller's argument that Gorton and the city were guilty of double-dealing-professing
good faith in their negotiations with the team while working behind the scenes to weaken
its financial standing and arrange a sale to local owners.").
213 Basketball Transcript, supra note 77, at 158.
[Vol. 16:195
Sharing Stories: Narrative Lawyering in Bench Trials
not the opening (delivered in trial but created prior to it). Making the
right adjustments requires the ability to view one's case objectively,
admit mistakes or failures as needed, and credit one's opponent when
due. These capacities are likely equally effective in jury trials, but (1)
the lack of good information as to jurors' views and (2) lawyer belief
in the force of their persuasive powers, especially before laypeople,
render them considerably more rare in such settings.
D. Learning to Dance
Defense counsel in the assault trial faced a difficult task in closing
argument. The mother's sympathetic (if also unimpressive) appear-
ance, the son's persuasive testimony, the dramatic power of the 911
recording, and the undeniable fact of the mother's injury combined to
form a weighty case for the prosecution. Even with the benefit of
hindsight and without the pressure of real-time decision-making, it is
hard to see a clear path to acquittal. The narrative lawyering litera-
ture embraces such challenges, celebrating the possibilities for crea-
tive advocacy in difficult circumstances, but also recognizing that even
exemplary lawyering may ultimately prove unsuccessful.
In his analysis of the closing argument attorney Gerry Spence de-
livered in the famous Silkwood trial,214 Meyer shows Spence weaving
together an array of narrative maneuvers, notwithstanding Spence's
frequent disavowal of rhetorical finery as a means of persuasion.21 5
Of most pertinence to bench trial lawyering, Meyer demonstrates
how, before launching his more elaborate moves, Spence affirms his
"ongoing dialogic relationship with the jurors. ' 216 He does this quite
simply, by acknowledging the gravity of what they have been through
together. With a directness that many lawyers would be hesitant to
attempt, Spence grounds his closing in the shared experience of the
trial: "I couldn't get over it-I couldn't sleep. I couldn't believe what
I had heard. I don't know how it affected you."2 17
Like virtually every other lawyer to ever try a case, defense coun-
sel in the assault case lacked Spence's self-assurance. She likewise did
not have a client who could, even with the most liberal poetic license,
be referred to as a prophet. 218 However, because the assault case was
214 Meyer, supra note 184; see also PETER C. LAGARIAS, EFFECrIVE CLOSING ARGU-
MENT 425 (1989) (offering excerpts and instructive discussion of Spence's closing and that
of his adversary, William Paul).
215 See LAGARIAS, supra note 214, at 429 (quoting Spence, who says: "Communicating
with people isn't simply playing back to them cute little techniques or manipulating them
with funny little arguments that are clever and thought to be convincing").
216 Id. at 251.
217 Id. at 250.
218 Id. at 254.
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a bench trial, she had something Spence did not. She knew (or should
have known) how the case had affected the judge. She had heard the
judge make the rulings regarding the two recordings. She had been in
the room when the recording of the mother was played. She had
fought with the judge to complete the various impeachments of the
mother. She had ample reason to conclude that he had not-and
would not ever-come to see the mother as the aggressor. She thus
had the opportunity (more accurately seen as the necessity) to at-
tempt a very difficult, but potentially very powerful lawyering maneu-
ver: acknowledging the tension within and then trying to re-direct and
redefine her "dialogic relationship" with her audience. The judge's
ruling-in which he emphasized the testimony of the son 219 and used
it whenever possible to bolster that of the mother-was consistent
with the numerous mid-trial signals described above regarding the
mother's relative weakness as a witness. This implicit admission that
he had been wrong about the mother at the start of the case, that she
was not the character he had expected her to be, suggests one way
counsel might have drawn the judge away from the rapid220 guilty ver-
dict he issued. Explicitly acknowledging her own changed apprecia-
tion of the mother, counsel might have used this common bond-the
trial as learning experience-as a way of reconceiving the entire case.
Depicting the mother as a monster was simple-she was indispu-
tably the first person to brandish an object-and almost certain to fail.
Moreover, the attack on the mother kept the trial locked in the wrong
emotional register. It was the mother who had written horror movie
motifs (blood in the bathroom, victims wrapped in towels, familiar ob-
jects such as doors and hangers, transformed into implements of
harm) into the trial. Counsel could have taken advantage of the
judge's desire to create a less hysterical, more sober environment in
the courtroom. Doing so likely required some recognition of the 911
call and what it demonstrated about the mother's experience of the
incident as a trauma. Demonstrating sympathy for her, even praising
her apparent intention to keep her children safe from harm,221 counsel
might have commanded the judge's attention for long enough to be
219 Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 2, 55:28-34 ("The testimony of the
brother, in my view, is very convincing."). Elsewhere, he finds the mother's testimony, at
least the part about being slashed with the hanger, merely "credible." Id. at Disk 2, 54:18-
23.
220 Less than two full seconds pass between the last word of the prosecutor's rebuttal
closing and the first word of the judge's ruling. Id. at Disk 2, 51:42-44.
221 See Dana Cole, Psychodrama and the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding the Story, 21
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (2001) (demonstrating how a cross-examination built around
sympathy for a witness's laudable motivations can be more devastating than conventional
destructive approaches).
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heard as she talked about the mother and daughter's joint need to
learn how to communicate and otherwise handle the tribulations of
adolescence. Thus fusing the lawyer-judge and mother-daughter units
into a larger community of learners, counsel would create a way for
the judge to envision the family as not in need of judicial interven-
tion.222 Their home is not a den of monsters, so permeated by ill-will
that the only question is: "Who acted worse, the sullen teen or the
frazzled mother?" Instead, it is, like most homes, a place where peo-
ple misunderstand each other and make bad decisions, but can grow
beyond their worst moments.
This line of advocacy requires counsel to be bold enough to con-
cede error without for a second ceasing to advocate. If this case had
been tried to a jury, counsel could have made a similar choice, but,
because of the more limited feedback, it would likely have been more
difficult for counsel to determine the fact-finder's assessment of the
witnesses and events, thus making such an unconventional move even
riskier. This is just one way in which the contrasts between the two
settings force distinctions between the narrative structures of bench
and jury trial closings. In the tight professional circle of a bench trial,
with lawyers and judges sharing traditions and, yes, stories, lawyers
must find a way to keep their advocacy fresh. Jury trial lawyers will
often return in closing argument to a familiar trope, a story that, al-
though they are telling it for the tenth time, is new to the audience.223
Bench trials force lawyers to be creative, to craft an argument that is
truly unique, a distillation of this case and the experience of trying it
in a way that will never be duplicated.
No amount of lawyerly creativity on the part of defense counsel
in the assault case could have conjured away the brother's incriminat-
222 In this regard, the trial might have arrived at an inverse point from the moment in
the Sonics trial when Judge Pechman wondered whether granting the city's request would
necessarily ensnarl the court in a series of future squabbles between the parties. Counsel
for the city needed to convince the judge she could act and then withdraw, leaving a peace-
ful relationship in place. Counsel for the defense in the assault case needed to show that
no intervention whatever was needed.
223 In the Silkwood trial, for example, Spence closed with what Meyer refers to as his
"trademark formulary anecdote," the Bird Story, a parable about a "wise old man ... and
a smart-aleck young boy." Meyer, supra note 184, at 265. Famed Chicago lawyer Eugene
Pincham regularly taught jurors to see the flaws in a prosecution by means of an analogy to
a story from his childhood, in which his mother always knew when he and his brother had
helped themselves to forbidden sugar because she would find "granules on the floor."
JAMES W. McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 683-84 (4th ed. 2006). In fact, Pincham told
this story so often that on at least one occasion, a prosecutor remarked to the judge during
the moments before closing that they had better be ready to hear it again. Steve Neal,
Pincham Pursues Political Mission, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, at 44. Legend has
it that Pincham responded that he would indeed tell it again and would continue to do so
until he stopped having success with it.
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ing testimony. This young man, introduced as a lifeguard in his late
teens, is trained, and seemingly naturally inclined, to protect, to han-
dle emergencies calmly.224 When the door falls on his sister, he calls
for his mother and moves to his sister's aid even though the tantrum
that brought the door down on her was apparently an indirect attack
on him for using the phone. Some brothers in this situation might
leave their sister to deal with the mess she made for herself; not this
brother. When his mother is overwhelmed, unable to finish the call
with the police, he takes over and ends up comforting her. With am-
ple opportunity to observe and a character that renders him immune
from any claim of intentional fabrication, he is a nearly invulnerable
witness. His testimony did, however, present one apparent flaw. He
denied that the mother had committed any aggressive acts, even those
that she herself had admitted. He testified that she had neither bran-
dished the hanger 225 nor ordered him to subdue his sister with wres-
tling moves.226 The mother readily admitted both of these acts,227 and
224 Miller offers another example of how employment or role can serve as a valuable
schema, communicating something about who a person is from what he routinely and con-
sistently does. Faced with allegations that her client provoked and escalated a dispute with
store security and police officers, she describes a case theory option that built upon the
helpful associations jurors might have with the client's occupation of janitor: "A janitor
mops floors and cleans up other people's messes.... A janitor does not challenge authority
unless he is pushed to the wall." Miller, supra note 109, at 550.
225 Defense counsel explored this subject from several angles, giving the young man
numerous chances to acknowledge at least the possibility that the mother did at some point
possess the hanger:
Counsel: Did you ever see your mom have a hanger in her hand?
Witness: No.
Counsel: Did you ever see your mom trying to ... defend herself from Michelle's
feet with the hanger?
Witness: No.
Counsel.: Did your mom ever have the hanger in her hand?
Witness: No.
Counsel: As far as you know, this hanger was always in Michelle's room?
Witness: Yes.
Counsel: And she was the only one that touched it?
Witness: Yes.
Counsel: And she's the one who picked it up and broke it in half?
Witness: Yes.
Domestic Disturbance, supra note 40, at Disk 2, 11:15-30.
226 Id. at Disk 2, 11:45-50.
227 Hanger: The mother testified on more than one occasion that she had picked up a
hanger and was poking at her daughter with it. She described with something approaching
awe the brute force with which the daughter had wrested the hanger from her hands. Id. at
Disk 2, 26:24-39.
Wrestling:
Counsel: Did you, uhm, you actually asked Steven to do a wrestling move on her?
Witness: Yeah.
Counsel: You asked him to pin her down?
Witness: This is after the door had hit the ground.
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there is little reason to doubt her.
Why would the brother have the specific memory failures he did?
As with the mother, counsel's best chances for success in closing lay in
exploiting the brother's strength, not his weakness. His protective in-
stinct runs strong from the time of the incident all the way through the
trial. His memory of the event obscures his mother's complicity, the
way she contributed to the escalation that so unhinged her. He is un-
consciously protecting her from embarrassment. He is also protecting
the entire family, including himself. Discussing this incident must be
quite embarrassing for a teenager, even a mature one. A certain
amount of the family's dirty laundry must be revealed, as the case is
before the court and it would be wrong to suggest that nothing had
happened. But who wants to be seen as the son of a hanger-wielding
wrestling-coach of a mom? His tone on the stand suggests no glee in
his sister's predicament, and his unconscious shading of the facts is
healthy, a sign that the family is viable. The flaws in the brother's
testimony might not add up to reasonable doubt, and they certainly do
not obscure the fact of the mother's bloody elbow. This should not be
surprising or overly disappointing. Narrative lawyering is not the pro-
duction of fiction. It is an attempt to present a case in a manner that
resonates with the fact-finder's lived experience, that which he brings
to the trial and that which he experiences during the trial. What
should be clear is that counsel's only hope of inducing even a brief
suspension of judgment lay in a narrative strategy that treated the
family as a complex entity, as all families are.
V. BUILDING BETTER BENCH TRIALS
Having examined the distinctive challenges that bench trials pre-
sent to lawyers, this Article will now look briefly at some ways of im-
proving the often intense and unusually loaded communication that
takes place within such trials. The first set of suggestions addresses
procedural reforms that can eliminate some of the unnecessary fric-
tion within bench trials. The second set calls for changes to lawyer
practice and self-concept that accommodate the way bench trials
work, as has been described so far.
A. Procedural Reform
This Article has demonstrated how judges frequently communi-
cate their views during bench trials. Sometimes intentionally, often
indirectly, but always meaningfully, judges speak and act in ways that
reveal their developing understanding of and reaction to the evidence
Id. at Disk 1, 103:45-50.
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and arguments. The procedural reforms suggested here are intended
to normalize additional opportunities for communication between
judges and lawyers so that the process as a whole is more effective and
more just.
1. Measuring Judges Before and After Trial: Voir Dire and Record-
keeping
As discussed in Part III, judges, like jurors, bring preconceptions
into any trial. Unlike jurors, judges are not subject to voir dire before
the trial begins. As described by Amsterdam et al., voir dire does
more than merely allow lawyers to learn about and select2 28 those who
will decide their case. The procedure enables lawyers to educate ju-
rors about the case and about the limits of what they think they al-
ready know.22 9 Surfacing details about the jurors' backgrounds,
lawyers are also able to get jurors' commitment to attempt to set aside
impermissible or extraneous factors. In closing argument, they can
and often do remind the jurors of this commitment and, if necessary,
explicitly point to the ways those dangerous influences might sneak
into their thinking if they are not vigilant.
Many judges would likely be offended by the suggestion,230 but
there are good reasons to ask them to engage in a similar process of
surfacing experiences and views prior to trial. Research into judge's
cognitive processes reveals the gap between actual and idealized judi-
cial decision making. Merely being asked a few pertinent questions
might prompt self-awareness that routine practice buries. It is com-
mon for jurors to be asked if they have ever served on a jury before.
If so, they are asked about that experience, its similarity, if any, to the
instant case, and what lessons they learned from having served. Jurors
in criminal cases are routinely asked if they know people who work in
228 Lawyers have limited tools for affecting the assignment of a judge to their case.
Lawyers can move for recusal, but, in part because the decision is committed to the judge
whose fitness to try the case would be questioned, lawyers rarely do so. Some jurisdictions
permit lawyers to request a new judge merely by filing an affidavit alleging prejudice
(somewhat akin to a peremptory strike of a juror), see WASH. REV. CODE § 4.12.050
(2008), but lawyers must then accept whatever judge is next assigned to the case.
229 See Alper, supra note 4, at 62 ("Voir dire played a key part in instructing prospective
jurors to accept skepticism as a proper starting point for performance of their fact-finding
responsibility."); see also id. at 67 ("[T]he prospective jurors had to be taught not simply to
be skeptical of their previous impressions regarding the facts, but to be skeptical specifi-
cally of the videotape, the centerpiece of the prosecution's case.").
230 See Peter David Blanck, Calibrating the Scales of Justice: Studying Judges' Behavior
in Bench Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1119, 1122-23 (1993) ("Most trial judges, however, receive
little feedback about their courtroom communication, and what little they do receive is
mostly anecdotal. This may be in part because there are few standardized methods through
which such feedback may be provided, judges are reluctant to receive such feedback, or
judges lack effective techniques for monitoring the impact of their courtroom behavior.").
[Vol. 16:195
Sharing Stories: Narrative Lawyering in Bench Trials
law enforcement and how such relationships might affect their assess-
ment of witness credibility. Juvenile court judges might profitably be
asked, "Can you recall the last time you made a finding of fact that a
police officer lied or testified with less than full candor?" or "How
many alleged child-on-parent assault cases have you presided over?
In how many of those cases was self-defense claimed? Have you ever
acquitted a respondent in such circumstances?"
In the face of (and even in the absence of) such a procedure, con-
scientious judges might begin to track their trial decision-making
along these lines. Better yet, a court system committed to accounta-
bility might impose such a system on its judges. Compiling this aggre-
gate data might tell a judge something she has been unable to see.231
The memory of the most recent acquittal will likely leave a long-last-
ing impression that will obscure the fact that it occurred several years
ago, an example of what social scientists refer to as the availability
heuristic.232 Appellate judges (and federal trial judges) are subject to
a substantial degree of review of this kind by virtue of the fact that
their opinions are published. State court trial judges, by contrast, are
largely immune. Individual decisions may come to light when con-
nected to a high-profile, and especially a notorious, case, but patterns
are almost certain to remain hidden from all, the public, the lawyers,
and even the judges themselves.
In the absence of regular processes for generating information
about trial judges' decisions, parties wind up dependent upon the
quality of the informal information networks upon which their lawyers
rely. These are as susceptible to the availability heuristic and other
forms of fallacious reasoning as is a judge's individual memory. It is
common today for counsel to send an email to various listserves ask-
ing for a judge's take on whatever issues counsel anticipates arising
during trial. Technology thus enables counsel to draw on a wider
range of experience than in the past, but, as with the judges them-
selves, lawyers will be prone to remembering the most emotionally
231 See Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe: Practical Meth-
ods for Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, 42 WILLAMEIrE L. REV. 1 (2006) (proposing
practices of judicial mindfulness as a means of overcoming "[the lack of a self-checking
mechanism" on judicial bias). Seamone's approach is entirely judge-focused. It seeks to
improve judges' appreciation for the situation of other actors, but it does not create oppor-
tunities for those actors to themselves become aware of or play a role in shaping the
judge's thinking.
232 See Cass Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2003) ("Lacking statistical information, people substitute an
easy question (Can I think of illustrations?) for a hard question (What realities do the data
actually show?)") (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY READER 38, 46-49 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986)).
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charged, rather than the most common, incidents. It would certainly
be possible for a bar group, a defender agency, or a prosecutor's office
to engage in more systematic record-keeping about judicial practices,
but resource constraints and the force of habit will likely make this a
rare development. The infrequency of appeals in the juvenile and
misdemeanor cases that make up such a considerable component of
the bench trial dockets means that electronic databases such as
Westlaw and Lexis will provide only episodic data, such as the case
recalled so strongly by the judge in the Safeway trial.2 33
The second reform proposal also seeks to improve the quality of
information-sharing that occurs within bench trials, this time by ad-
vancing in time and increasing the frequency of the opportunity for
lawyers to make clear to the court the significance of the accumulating
evidence. Guggenheim and Hertz point out that "the common jury
trial strategy of eliciting apparently insignificant concessions upon
cross-examination and weaving them together in closing argument
may be counterproductive in a bench trial. ' 234 They trace this danger
to the fact that "many judges make up their minds about the verdict
before hearing closing argument" and thus may rule without ever fully
appreciating "the actual significance of a cross-examination. 235
While some judges might resist the suggestion that their minds are
"made up" by the time of closing, each of the three judges described
in this Article revealed a fairly firmly-held view on at least one pivotal
issue before (and sometimes well before) the lawyers closed.
Guggenheim and Hertz advise lawyers to "surface the implica-
tions"236 of their examinations so that the judge appreciates and con-
siders them before it is too late. This advice comes with the caveat
that lawyers do so without providing the witness or opposing attorney
the chance to detract from the examination's effectiveness. Threading
this needle between clarity and indirection is a formidable task. Con-
sider one hypothetical example offered by Amsterdam et al. in the
jury trial context. They imagine "a prosecutor in a strangulation-mur-
der case us[ing] language in examining witnesses and arguing to the
jury which successfully evokes a juror's recollection of the automobile
garroting episode near the end of The Godfather I."'237 It might be
possible to plant some language in an examination which is then
drawn out in closing for this effect, although even this would be hard
233 Experience in nearly two decades of juvenile court practice has shown that even a
measure such as running a Westlaw search to review a judge's opinions is rare.
234 Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 591.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Alper, supra note 4, at 15.
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to do in a way that was not unduly inflammatory. It is hard to imagine
how one could do it on the examination alone. The rules governing
cross examination are designed to keep lawyers and witnesses tied to
the facts rather than their explicating their meaning. Pushing too hard
to "surface the implications" of an examination will produce success-
ful objections that the lawyer is being argumentative. The best law-
yers can find this narrow pinpoint of balance, but justice demands that
parties whose lawyers have not attained this level of mastery also have
their cases fully heard.
One way of addressing this would be to adapt another practice
from jury trials: the interim summation. Often, in lengthy or complex
civil trials, judges will allow counsel the opportunity to argue the sig-
nificance of the evidence to jurors before all of the evidence is in.238 If
a jury hears a highly technical examination of an expert early in a tort
trial, the substance of the witness's data and opinions are likely to
wash away if the jurors must wait three weeks before hearing from
counsel about how to make sense of them. During an interim summa-
tion, lawyers are permitted to argue the evidence at the close of (and
sometimes even during) an examination. The problem identified here
with respect to bench trials is not the same as the limits on juror mem-
ory or understanding, but the cure seems equally effective. Recall the
mid-impeachment query of the judge in the domestic assault case,
"Counsel, I'm wondering what difference it makes. '239 Interim sum-
mation would allow counsel to address such concerns even when the
judge does not share them so frankly. Allowing such summations,
with judicial questioning during them, would normalize the process of
feedback and adjustment that takes place in bench trials already but
currently in an ad hoc fashion. These two proposals share the feature
that each would open up the thinking processes of the actors. Hidden
beliefs and masked agendas would be replaced by a more direct en-
gagement, one that seems better suited to resolving a dispute that has
been committed to members of a common order.
B. New Moves for Trial Lawyers
1. Re-considering the Impact of Pretrial Motions in Criminal and
Juvenile Bench Trials
Neither lawyer in the Safeway trial made an opening statement.
Such waivers are common in many juvenile courts,240 presumably due
238 Robin Cauthron, What Trial Judges Would Like To Say to Trial Judges, 31 N.M. L.
REV. 241 (2001); Susan J. Macpherson, Tools To Keep Jurors Engaged, 44 MAR. TRIAL 32
(2008).
239 See supra text accompanying note 152.
240 See RANDY HERTZ, MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MAN-
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to the widely-held belief that narrative sophistication, and even advo-
cacy, is wasted in bench trials. Decrying this lamentable and slowly-
eroding tradition is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the
procedural history that preceded the waivers in the Safeway trial is
highly instructive with respect to dangers faced by committed law-
yers241 who approach bench trials with the seriousness they deserve
but mistakenly believe this obligates them to litigate bench trial cases
in every respect as if a jury was going to decide them. The waivers in
the Safeway trial reflected little tactical consideration, 242 but because
they immediately followed a pretrial suppression hearing, they sharply
illustrate this common dilemma.243
Because suppression litigation in criminal and juvenile cases
often takes place on the day (or eve) of trial and before the trial judge,
whether and how lawyers litigate such motions may have as dramatic
an impact on the judge as opening statements do in a jury trial. Pre-
trial litigation detached from a well-founded theory of impression for-
mation does not merely delay but may actually compromise counsel's
chance to shape the judge's initial impression by means of a compel-
ling opening. Judges' ability to ignore incriminating evidence which
they have ordered suppressed has received considerable attention in
the literature, with unsurprisingly inconclusive results.244 Because
UAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE COURT 580 (2d ed. 2008) ("In many jurisdic-
tions it is customary for both sides to waive opening statement in a bench trial.").
241 For an exploration of how good lawyers, with a demonstrated commitment to their
clients and their craft, can nevertheless wind up trapped by seemingly benign aspects of
their practice environment, see Doyle, supra note 63, at 419 ("[F]ascination with the short-
comings of bad lawyers obscures a deeper issue. What do good lawyers do when they
'represent' a death penalty client?") (emphasis in original).
242 At the start of the trial-in-chief, the prosecutor asked the judge if he would like
counsel to make opening statements. The judge replied, "If you feel the need to make an
opening statement, you may do so." Detecting that the judge did not strongly "feel the
need" to hear openings, the prosecutor suggested a brief one, but then waived altogether
after the judge pointed out that the witness, still on the stand from the motion hearing,
would need to leave the courtroom pursuant to the Rule on Witnesses. Safeway Theft,
supra note 37, at Disk 1, 56:21-50. The prosecutor appeared to be trying, albeit clumsily, to
both present his case completely and remain engaged with his audience. Defense counsel
waived opening without comment or strain, see id. at Disk 1, 56:55, true to the ineffectual
nature described above, see supra note 120.
243 See Alper, supra note 4, at 119 ("Recent legal scholarship on story-telling in litiga-
tion thus suggests the extent to which an advocate's decisions about most basic aspects of
trial conduct-pretrial maneuvers, opening and closing statements, presentation of evi-
dence, and even behavior in the courtroom-implement strategic judgments about the na-
ture of the story s/he will communicate to the fact-finder.").
244 Compare Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 573 ("[I]t strains the imagination to believe
that a judge would not be affected by knowledge of a confession, if only at an unconscious
level."), with Guthrie, Judges Ignore, supra note 9, at 1322 (discussing experimental re-
search showing that although, as a general matter, "suppressing the influence of informa-
tion that is supposed to be ignored will be difficult," judges evaluated experimentally were
apparently able to ignore confessions or unconstitutionally obtained physical evidence).
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suppression motions are granted quite infrequently, however, lawyers
need to pay greater attention to the impact of unsuccessful suppres-
sion claims.
In the course of their research into judicial cognition, Wistrich,
Guthrie, and Rachlinski, affirm "the dramatic effect of first impres-
sions. '2 45 In making this point, they refer to a landmark psychological
study in which subjects were read a set of six adjectives: intelligent,
industrious, impulsive, critical, stubborn, envious.246 One group heard
the words in the above order; the second group heard the same words,
but in reverse order. The group that heard the desirable characteris-
tics (intelligent and industrious) first developed more favorable im-
pressions of the hypothetical person being described than did those in
the other group. The same negative traits which, when heard first, cre-
ated an image of a "problem" personality, were viewed, in the first
condition, as mere shortcomings which did not outweigh the individ-
ual's merits.
The Safeway case provides a useful platform for considering the
implications of this psychological insight (and the broader subject of
the power of first impressions) for bench trial defense lawyers choos-
ing between litigating a colorable but not compelling suppression mo-
tion or electing to move directly to openings. 247 The lead police
officer testified that even after developing fairly strong evidence im-
plicating the respondent, he did not arrest the youth but instead
merely invited him to the police station. As the officer described it, "I
had good reason to believe that he was the person that ran from me
but giving him the benefit of the doubt, instead of making an arrest
and not being 100% sure, I asked for his cooperation in the investiga-
Guthrie et al. acknowledge:
[These results] raise ... serious questions about the applicability of our results to the
real world. It might be easy enough in hypothetical assessments to assert that an
important constitutional principle would prevent one from convicting a defendant.
Exonerating a real, live defendant that a judge knows to be guilty might be a more
serious matter.
Id. at 1322. This speculation comports with the experience of this Article's author as a
clinical teacher. For several semesters, students in the Seattle University Youth Advocacy
Clinic have participated in a mock confession suppression hearing using the materials
found in Diane Geraghty, Thomas F. Geraghty & Angela Vigil, In re Pena: Representing
Children and Families in Juvenile Court, in IN RE PENA: REPRESENTING CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES IN JUVENILE COURT (2002). Despite ample evidence in the record supporting
the state's case-evidence that this author suspects would regularly doom defense motions
in real life-no judge has (mock) ordered that the statement of this hypothetical thirteen-
year-old girl be admitted.
245 See Guthrie, Judges Ignore, supra note 9, at 1266.
246 Id.
247 This dilemma does not exist in a jury trial for the simple reason that jurors are not
present for the pretrial litigation.
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tion. '248 Shortly after arriving at the station and after being told he
was free to leave, the respondent admitted involvement in the inci-
dent. Advised of his Miranda rights, he made a more complete and
more incriminating statement. The judge reasonably found the police
had engaged in "by the book, police constitutional process" 249 and ad-
mitted the statement.
Understood in light of the adjective study, this pretrial litigation
did more than merely establish the admissibility of the statement. It
cloaked the state's case, which had its genesis in this investigation and
interrogation, in an aura of legitimacy.250 This would prove to be im-
portant, because the rest of the evidence did not go in smoothly for
the state. Neither of its eyewitnesses identified the respondent as the
second youth present at the incident nor offered any testimony di-
rectly implicating that youth in the assault. The judge's finding of
guilt of the lesser offense of Assault in the Third Degree suggests a
close parallel to the adjective study, with the strong first impression
("by the book, police constitutional process") lapsing slightly with the
clumsy and underwhelming later proof.
Had there been no pretrial hearing on the statement,251 the
judge's first encounter with the facts would have come in the opening
statements. In such an opening, the state would certainly have men-
tioned the respondent's admission prominently.2 52 The fact that the
defense had conceded the statement's admissibility would certainly
signal to the judge that the police had done things the right way.
However, several things would likely have happened to improve the
248 Safeway Theft, supra note 37, at Disk 1, 25:15.
249 Id. at Disk 1, 54:50.
250 Consistent with the culture of practice in this court, the witnesses at the suppression
hearings did not reveal the contents of the statement before the judge had ruled (as doing
so would cause unnecessary taint if the statements are suppressed). Thus, the judge did not
know what it was that the respondent had said.
251 WASH. JUv. CT. R. 3.5 (2009) (paralleling the rule in criminal cases) requires the
court to hold a hearing whenever a statement of the accused is to be offered in evidence.
Thus, lawyers in Washington arrive at this decision from a somewhat different rhetorical
position than their counterparts in jurisdictions where a hearing will be held only if the
defense takes the affirmative step of filing a motion.
252 Even so, "[t]he defense is better off, however, having only to deal with the mention
of the evidence in the opening, rather than having the judge hear it first in motions and
then again in opening." Sharifi, supra note 117, at 692 n.13. Recognizing the impact of
primacy and repetition also has implications for the practice of having courts adopt pretrial
motion testimony for purposes of trial. Some able and dedicated defenders resist this prac-
tice as a matter of principle, ostensibly to honor the client's right to put the state to its full
proof and exploit the possibility that a witness's testimony will vary between the two itera-
tions of it. The short interval makes this unlikely. The judicial disinclination to place much
weight on inconsistencies, see supra text accompanying note 147, makes this generally un-
profitable and, because it results in the repetition of harmful testimony, often counter-
productive.
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standing of the defense case as compared to the trial-after-suppres-
sion-hearing alternative. One, the judge would not have seen the of-
ficer yet and come to his own conclusion about his performance; two,
the defense would have had the opportunity, during its opening, to
direct the court toward its chosen issues; and three, by choosing its
battles, the defense would have communicated the intention to re-
serve its fire for the critical points, as Brad Keller did in the Sonics'
trial. With the opening statements in the hypothetical reconfigured
Safeway trial completed, the state would likely not have called the
officer to the stand first. Because the case was ultimately about what
happened at the Safeway, the two Safeway witnesses, the manager
and the security guard/victim would likely have testified first.2 53 With
their testimony coming in as unimpressively as it did in the actual trial,
the state's case would have been an underwhelming mess of unan-
swered questions at this point. The officers' testimony would likely
have filled in the crucial gaps somewhat, but, "given the dramatic ef-
fect of first impressions," it seems at least possible that the unfavora-
ble first impression, tweaked in a positive direction toward the end,
might leave the state struggling to hold on to any conviction at all
rather than merely falling short of its top charge.
The significance of the decision to contest suppression or proceed
directly to opening is greater in cases in which the statement of the
accused is not completely incriminating on its face. Imagine that in-
stead of saying, "I hit the security guard," the respondent had said "I
went over to help my friend." This might provide enough evidence to
circumstantially establish the respondent's involvement in the attack.
However, the correctness of the police work would likely have less of
a rescue effect for the state's case when what it produced was so much
less conclusive. A defense argument based on reasonable doubt
would stand a much better chance against such a background.
The suggestion to refrain from filing motions with low chances of
success and significant prospects for blowback may seem obvious, but
it is not made lightly. Even forty-plus years after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault,254 the juvenile courts of the
United States are not beset with an overabundance of suppression
motions. In fact, through its surveys of practice in many states, the
253 To the extent that this speculative analysis has merit, a prosecutor who thought in
this way could (and should) make the unconventional move and call the police first. Years
of observation in juvenile courts in many jurisdictions has shown few examples of such
careful thinking about the order of witnesses. Judges are seen as bookkeepers and testi-
mony as lacking any sequential dimension. To the extent the decision reflects much think-
ing at all, it is usually governed by concern for excusing non-police witnesses as soon as
possible.
254 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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National Juvenile Defender Center has identified the failure to file
viable suppression motions as a major concern. 255 Nevertheless, effec-
tive defense should mean the right motions, not simply more motions.
In a criminal case in which the fact-finder, i.e., the jury, plays no role
in the pretrial proceedings, defense counsel runs no risk of creating
any adverse first impressions when litigating any colorable suppres-
sion claim. The fact that good criminal defense lawyers would file the
motion in an identical criminal case is, at best, a starting point for a
juvenile defender's strategy. Treating juvenile defense as a "lesser in-
cluded practice" of criminal defense provides far more protection for
the rights of youth than the historical defender reticence which has
long resulted from concern for the youth's best interests. However,
lawyers ill-serve their clients when they ignore essential characteristics
of the tribunal. It may seem safer and at the same time truer to the
defender's appropriate self-image as the client's champion to choose
the course that involves action, such as filing a motion, than to tacti-
cally refrain, but the wisdom to so refrain is one of the hallmarks of
professional expertise.256
2. Appreciating Mediation
The discussion of the closings in the Sonics trial highlighted in-
stances when the trial seemed almost like a mediation, with the judge
speaking through the forms inherent in a trial but communicating a
message about the appropriateness of settlement. In various ways,
bench trials, including criminal cases, collapse the traditional gaps2 57
between mediation and litigation (and the narrative structures they
enact),258 making skills prized by mediators of particular use to liti-
255 See. e.g., THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., VIR-
GINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 26 (2002). Similar assessments from other states can be
found at http://www.njdc.info/assessments.php.
256 See Gary Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and
the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 322 (1995); see also Leipold, supra note 2,
at 218-19 (exploring the psychological barriers to waiving jury trials even when judges are
demonstrably more prone to acquit, and stating that "[g]oing to trial is risky enough, and
the preference for juries ingrained enough, that most lawyers are undoubtedly reluctant to
waive a jury without a very good reason, one that can be articulated and later defended to
co-workers, supervisors, and the defendant").
257 The culture of criminal practice has generally devalued dispute resolution skills other
than litigation fierceness and excellence. See Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, "From Day
One": Who's in Control as Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center
Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 11, 17 (2004) ("However, while mediation,
arbitration, and the art of settlement are taught and extolled on the civil side, similar skills
are not only not taught, they are frequently demeaned in many traditional criminal defense
circles.").
258 Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of Dis-
pute Resolution, 10 CLiN. L. REv. 833, 834 (2004) (referring to the traditional notion of
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gators in this context. In his comparison of the narrative patterns
common to litigation and mediation, Robert Rubinson observes that
many forms of mediation do not "presume that one 'story' has an ex-
clusive claim to the truth" 259 and that mediation embraces the notion
that perceptions can be unstable. 260 As we have seen, flexibility and
open-mindedness, even comfort with indeterminacy, are traits that
have greater value in bench trials than jury trials. Rubinson also notes
that "mediators decline the role of hero. ' 261 Brad Keller's closing in
the Sonics trial reflected an anti-heroic sentiment. He critiqued the
sentimental and grand vision of a resurrected franchise and re-ener-
gized fan base that he detected implicit in the City's case. His call to
"stop the bleeding" was a request for a measured intervention, and
one which the judge seemed inclined to grant. The alternative closing
explored here for the assault case likewise scaled back ambition for
both the lawyer and the judge. Of course, the approach of the
Safeway judge reflected the classical heroic motif that Rubinson uses
for his contrast. The point here is not to suggest that bench trials are
always radically different from jury trials. Instead, they require law-
yers to draw upon a broader range and finer assortment of skills and
approaches.
Mediation places a premium on listening skills. In a book section
headed "Persuasion Through Effective Listening," John Cooley ex-
horts that "[]istening with your mind fully engaged and your com-
plete attention directed toward the speaker can be more powerful
than the spoken word. ' 262 Whether serving as a mediator or an advo-
cate in mediation, lawyers learn to communicate via silence. Trial law-
yers stand to benefit greatly from an enhanced capacity to appreciate
in full what their opponent, and, even more important, the judge is
saying. Trial lawyers generally receive little training on attending to
non-verbal communication. 263 Leonard Riskin describes the depth re-
quired for achieving the desired perspective in mediation by writing
that mediators must be able to "experience both sides of a contro-
versy."' 264 Riskin's use of the word "experience" is highly significant.
"Experiencing" encompasses more than merely understanding, as it
includes a sense of empathy for the opposed positions, a deeper form
of listening and feeling. For lawyers in a bench trial, this empathy
litigation, observes that "[m]ediation creates and resolves disputes in ways that are utterly
alien to the norms of advocacy").
259 Id. at 835.
260 Id. at 857-58.
261 Id. at 855.
262 JOHN COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 169 (2d ed. 2002).
263 For one of these rare examples, see Dana Cole, supra note 221.
264 See Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 58 (1982).
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would need to encompass the opponent and the judge. Any good trial
lawyer identifies an opponent's strongest arguments and prepares to
neutralize them. Typically, this is done through force of logic and
other rhetorical attacks. Precisely because judges are trained in the
same habits of logic and can see through many rhetorical attacks,
bench trial lawyers need to dig deeper and expose themselves a bit
more. As the discussions of the Sonics and assault trials revealed, can-
did acknowledgment of the strength of an opponent's position will
often engender a greater receptivity from the court than will a full-
bore attack that minimizes the weaknesses of one's own case or mis-
characterizes those of one's opponent. Rather than reflecting vulner-
ability, as many may fear, such a posture is likely to create an
impression of wisdom and judgment that imbues one's arguments with
enhanced persuasiveness. This is not a call to import into all bench
trials the lax model of representation that has regrettably character-
ized America's juvenile courts for so many years. Instead, it is a rec-
ommendation to fight smarter, not louder. 265 Of course, a trial is not a
mediation. There is little room within trial procedure for the sort of
reflection, either vocal or silent, that mediators routinely do. How-
ever, training trial lawyers to develop the ability to hear other voices
(and to hear themselves as others do) would enable them to make
adjustments that may prove especially valuable in bench trials.
Analogizing mediation to jazz improvisation, John Cooley quotes
a music scholar describing how "[p]erformers and listeners form a
communication loop in which the actions of each continuously affect
the other. '266 This notion of a communication loop, running cease-
lessly, is a useful image for re-thinking lawyer's approach to bench
trials. The double-source of this notion is quite useful for expanding
or recasting the ideal of what makes trial lawyers effective. Lawyers
will rarely, if ever, have the freedom to explore the possibilities of a
particular performance in the way that jazz musicians do, but bench
trials do present opportunities for creative, even improvisatory, ad-
justments. The Sonics case demonstrates the potential benefit to a
lawyer of acknowledging weaknesses that the lawyer is aware of at the
start of a trial. Doing so earns the lawyer credibility and attention.
Lawyers stand to benefit equally from choosing the more daunting
task of making course corrections to address weaknesses that become
265 Given the cultural prominence of the gladiator model of trial lawyering, lawyers ex-
ploring this alternative approach should consult with clients and explain the expected ben-
efits of it.
266 John Cooley, Mediation, Improvisation, and All That Jazz, 2007 J. DisP. RESOL. 325,
331 (2007) (quoting Paul F. Berliner, THINKING IN JAZZ: THE INFINITE ART OF IMPROVISA-
ION 459 (1994)).
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apparent while the trial is underway. A judge is far more likely than a
jury to welcome, let alone tolerate, counsel's adjustment of an earlier
position because the judge understands that cases are to be decided on
evidence and law, not on advocates' positions. Obviously, a lawyer
should prepare thoroughly and thoughtfully so as to minimize the
need for such adjustments, but, as the cases described above show,
there is little profit in holding firm to a losing position. Moreover, for
as long as such acts of re-direction remain rare, those that are well-
chosen are likely to make a considerable positive impact. To achieve
that proper tone, lawyers need to appreciate that improvisation is not
about doing just anything in the moment, it is about following one's
instincts in light of preparation and deep attention to the activity one
is engaged in, including others' contributions to it.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a generally neglected genre of lawyer
performance-the bench trial-through the lens of narrative law-
yering theory. This analysis has revealed that the difference between
bench trial mastery and misadventure is often rooted in the way law-
yers manage two characteristics of bench trials: immediacy and inti-
macy. The pressure of immediacy arises from judges' familiarity with
the trial process and lawyer practice. Driven by a desire for efficiency
as well as inescapable human cognitive dependence upon heuristics,
judges move swiftly to assess cases and will not always see what may
lie beneath the surface of a seemingly simple or familiar pattern.
Lawyers must move equally quickly, yet thoughtfully, before the judge
forms adverse-and often irreversible-conclusions about the case.267
Often, the ultimate goal of persuasion can be achieved only after suc-
cess at the preliminary task of inducing a pause, creating the space in
which the variances between the judge's expectations and the story
the lawyer wishes to tell can be set forth.
It may seem oxymoronic to speak of the intimacy of bench trials.
Conventional wisdom deems them prosaic, boring; the term "bench
trial" connotes flatness and impersonality. This view fails to appreci-
ate the often intricate challenges lawyers face in responding to judicial
involvement in the trial. Whether measured (as in the Sonics trial),
267 Seeing a model for mediators in jazz improvisation, John Cooley has located great
value in a performer's ability to move quickly to convey command and substance. See
Cooley, supra note 266, at 328 ("[T]he quality of the performance depends on the depth
and flexibility of the hierarchy and upon the performer's ability to exploit the hierarchy
quickly.") (quoting ROBERT JOURDAIN, Music, THE BRAIN, AND ECSTASY: How Music




rampant (as in the Safeway trial), or conflictual (as in the domestic
assault trial), such involvement collapses the distance between lawyer
and factfinder. These close encounters are pivotal moments, and law-
yers must approach them with a set of advocacy skills as comprehen-
sive as, but often more refined than, those needed before a jury.
Above all, the lawyer's trial plan, and especially mid-trial adjustments
to it, must reflect a considered assessment of where the judge is, not
merely a hopeful projection of where the lawyer wants her to be (or
where she thinks a jury would be).
The closeness, or intimacy, of bench trials has a familial sense as
well. Members of the same profession, judges and lawyers share a
vocabulary, a code of ethics, certain formative experiences (such as
law school and the bar exam) and a responsibility for justice. Judges
may view experienced lawyers as peers entitled to respect. Less ex-
perienced lawyers represent the future of the profession and may ap-
pear as charges in need of guidance and example. The ongoing nature
of the relationship creates a set of obligations and expectations that
are necessarily distinct from the one-time and more distant relation-
ship between lawyers and jurors. This common ground layers every
move between lawyers and judges with extra meaning. It makes it
easy to say things more economically, but, as in families, it also makes
it far easier for minor discord or misunderstandings to assume greater
significance than they warrant. This long-term connection (and often
familiarity) calls for deftness and subtlety from lawyers, placing a pre-
mium on the wise silence and the subtle adjustment over the grand
gesture.
When they consider bench trials, if they do at all, many observ-
ers-and even participants-see mainly the restraints the form of the
trial imposes upon lawyers. As with many classes of performance,
however, the restraints, when properly understood, merely channel
and need not thwart the inspiration of creative practitioners. 268 Al-
though different in identifiable ways from what happens with juries,
the process of judgment that takes place within bench trials retains the
core human quality of working through narrative. This Article has
shown how lawyers can develop stories that draw power from the
unique characteristics of bench trial communication. Subtly adapting
conventional advocacy styles, lawyers can lift bench trials from the
cultural oblivion in which they have long operated and improve the
chances that judges will appreciate the power of their clients' cases.
268 See VIOLA SPOLIN, IMPROVISATION FOR THE THEATER 6 (1963) ("[T]he acceptance
of all the imposed limitations creates the playing.").
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